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ABSTRACT 
This report examined the nature of domestic illegal firearms trafficking, including 
key features and predictors of firearms trafficking, and rationalizes the defining of domestic 
illegal firearms trafficking into three levels that are indicative of the seriousness and 
features inherent to the particular level of trafficking.  This report also examined the scope 
of the trafficking situations at their respective levels, the means already being utilized to 
address firearms trafficking problems, and their effectiveness.  Finally, this report 
recognizes that the differing levels of trafficking may require varied and differing efforts be 
used in combating firearms trafficking and policy recommendations involving both 
legislative and enforcement efforts are detailed at the respective levels of trafficking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
The purpose of this report is to examine the policies that address domestic illegal 
firearms trafficking in the United States. While crime in general has been on the decline, 
there are persistent factors that contribute to the maintenance of criminal activity. One is 
drugs and the other is firearms. In trafficking investigations and assessments, we see the 
two linked together. Firearms support drug trafficking operations and each trafficking 
operation can support the other operation financially. Because of the nature of drug 
trafficking, violence is often associated with it and firearms help perpetuate a cycle of 
violence. Firearms trafficking, while enabling guns to be put in the hands of street 
criminals, also has a broader scope as it arms drug trafficking organizations and other 
criminal and extremist groups. While firearms trafficking may seem ancillary to a problem 
like drug trafficking, it in fact supports criminal enterprises and without some way to 
restrict it, it allows a greater level of violence to be thrust upon law enforcement agents and 
citizens alike. 
  For this purpose, domestic illegal firearms trafficking will be defined as the illegal 
firearms trade that occurs both within the borders of the United States and illegal cross-
border firearms trafficking to Mexico and Canada where the firearms originated in the 
United States. This is the definition that will be used throughout the report in reference to 
domestic illegal firearms trafficking. In the sections that follow, the report will detail the 
importance of studying U.S. trafficking policy. This report considers that in determining 
what effective policy is, that effectiveness be judged on whether the efforts made might be 
beneficial to limiting firearms trafficking. In examining the data and information available
2 
 
on a number of efforts in limiting trafficking, there is little empirical evidence of how 
effective any particular program is in reducing firearms trafficking. It is with this 
consideration that, while this report will indicate what programs and efforts may be 
effective, it relies on the individual agencies to make the determination of how effective 
their efforts are.  
It will be demonstrated that the scope of domestic illegal firearms trafficking is 
wide and varied and that there is a framework of U.S. law designed to address domestic 
illegal firearms trafficking that should be examined to determine if existing legislation is 
sufficient and effective enough to have an impact on trafficking. It will also be 
demonstrated that domestic illegal firearms trafficking contributes to violent crime, 
provides a means of engaging in illegal activity for individuals and criminal organizations, 
and fosters corruption. Further, this proposal will demonstrate that the lead agency in 
combating domestic illegal firearms trafficking, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (BATFE), has engaged in practices and programs that could benefit from 
analysis of their effectiveness.   
The U.S. government’s policy to address this trafficking is two-fold. The first focus 
relies upon legislative remedies. The National Firearms Act (NFA) and the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 are two examples of laws that were enacted to limit the access of certain 
firearms to certain individuals. The report will examine whether these and other laws have 
been effective in limiting illegal trafficking and whether proposed legislative efforts will 
likely be effective. Recommendations will be made that should guide the crafting of 
effective legislation while roadblocks to effective passage and enforcement of legislation 
will be determined.  
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The second focus of U.S. policy is on utilizing law enforcement investigations and 
industry compliance to limit trafficking both within the borders of the United States and 
across the nation’s borders to Canada and Mexico. Because the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) is positioned to be the lead agency in 
addressing firearms trafficking the report will examine the BATFE to see how effective the 
agency is in limiting illegal firearms trafficking. It will assess the effectiveness of their 
methods and programs that have and are being used to combat illegal firearms trafficking, 
and their ability to coordinate with other agencies at not just a federal level but also at a 
state and local level as well. Additionally, the report will examine the effectiveness of the 
BATFE’s industry compliance and enforcement efforts and the roadblocks the Bureau 
faces in enforcement and intelligence gathering that are inherent in trafficking issues. 
As will be demonstrated in the following section, the scope of the trafficking 
problem is wide and varied and the position of the author is that the examination of 
effective policy can best be accomplished by considering illegal trafficking as being 
composed of three levels. The author considers that, similar to drug trafficking, different 
levels of the trafficking involve different actors, with different motivations, and different 
means of accomplishing their specific goals. For example, procuring a firearm for an 
associate who is a felon may not be done for a primarily profit driven motive but rather as a 
favor. The motivations,  means, and effort for this actor is certainly different than 
traffickers who seek to move larger quantities of firearms across state lines to generate 
illegal income. Because of these inherent differences, to address firearms trafficking it will 
be more efficient and effective to define the broader trafficking picture into levels 
dependent upon activity. 
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Low level trafficking could involve as little as a single illegal transaction, is most 
likely to be situated in cities, and is unlikely to extend beyond a particular state’s border to 
any great degree. Mid-level trafficking involves a larger number of illegal transactions and 
likely involves interstate transport, more involvement from organized criminal groups, and 
possibly assistance and support from firearms dealers. High level trafficking is generated 
by shipping firearms in violation of U.S. export law across the borders of both Mexico and 
Canada. These shipment may also involve the transfer of firearms that are illegal to be 
exported or possessed, will likely involve large criminal organizations and their associates 
on one or both ends of the transaction, will require some degree of sophisticated, organized 
smuggling operation, and will likely involve a significant number of, or high market value, 
firearms. 
By examining in more detail the features and conditions that are both unique and 
similar to these three levels of trafficking, more effective policies recommendations can be 
presented. Each of these levels will pose a unique challenge to law enforcement and will 
require different enforcement efforts and tools. These levels will be examined individually 
and this paper will seek to develop and refine more effective policy recommendations in 
both the legislation and enforcement focuses to address the different challenges the levels 
pose. 
The author has had a life-long interest in crime and criminal activities and is well 
versed in criminal techniques, has been a firearms owner and enthusiast for over 35 years, 
and is currently a licensed private investigator with over 16 years of experience. From this 
background, the author has developed a wide and varied experience and knowledge base 
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concerning investigations, intelligence gathering, firearms law, illegal firearms, the nature 
of trafficking, and firearms in general, and will draw on this base throughout the paper. 
Scope of Trafficking 
The United States has the largest gun ownership per capita of developed nations, 
approximately 89 guns for every 100 U.S. citizens (Small Arms Survey, 2007). There are 
hundreds of manufacturers based in the United States. In 2008 they produced almost 1.4 
million pistols and slightly more than 1.6 million rifles. The United States legally exported 
only about 54,000 pistols and 104,000 rifles from those totals in 2008 (BATFE 2010). Gun 
manufacturers in the United States range from large established domestic manufacturers 
like Strum Ruger and Remington to foreign manufacturers with domestic facilities like 
Heckler Koch and Beretta. In addition, a number of smaller firms with government 
contracts, specialty weapons manufacturers, small gun shops, and individuals who 
manufacture on a hobby basis all add to the sources of firearms in this country. There are 
over 55,000 federally licensed firearm dealers in the United States. Legal importation of 
firearms from other countries, most notably from former communist bloc countries, also 
provides a source for the firearm supply that currently exists.   
The significant number of weapons and sources contribute to the illegal firearms 
trade in this country. This trade helps support and contributes to violent drug trafficking 
(Government Accounting Office, 2009) and violent street crime (National Institute of 
Justice, 1997) and it is this link that provides a justification for this avenue of research. 
Having a better understanding of trafficking and the means used to combat it is necessary 
to make informed policy recommendations which will enhance the efforts currently being 
made and have an effect on both trafficking and violent crime. The paper will focus on 
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trafficked weapons called small arms, which include semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, 
semi-automatic and fully automatic high capacity rifles, machine pistols, and sniper rifles 
(GAO, 2009, Violence Policy Center, 2009., National Institute of Justice, 1997, Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, 2007). The sources of these weapons range from new and used 
weapons (from theft or purchase) to military stock and surplus (National Gang Intelligence 
Center, 2007). The destination of these weapons range from individuals restricted from 
firearm ownership (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006), domestic criminal gangs 
(Heinzmann, 2004), and cross border traffic to criminal gangs and drug cartels (Associated 
Press, 2011). The wide scope of illegal firearms trafficking suggests that efforts necessary 
to combat trafficking run the gamut of legislation, firearms industry compliance, and varied 
law enforcement operations and that these policy aspects are deserving of examination in 
order to insure they are being utilized in the most effective way. 
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BACKGROUND 
To better inform the audience, this paper will examine the existing legislation that is 
intended to control the illegal domestic trafficking of firearms. The most pertinent laws will 
be explained and discussed to better assess their impact on trafficking. Additionally, a 
review will be conducted of assessments of the state of illegal trafficking as it applies to the 
United States. This review should provide justification for the need to examine the 
trafficking issue and possible avenues to address the problem. 
Notable Legislation 
 Foremost in the discussion of illegal trafficking is defining the illegal activity and 
the illegality of the firearms themselves. The illegality may occur in transferring firearms to 
an individual restricted from firearm possession by any of the actors involved in the 
transfer itself,  it may also occur through a transfer involving someone not appropriately 
licensed as a Federal Firearm Licensee (FFL). Additionally it may involve transfers that 
violate other conditions such as residency or a type of regulated firearm. Following is a 
brief examination of the laws currently in place, former laws and proposed legislation that 
define conditions of illegality, regulation, and possession relative to their effect on illegal 
domestic firearms trafficking. 
The National Firearms Act (NFA) was the first significant legislative action to 
control access to firearms by individuals. It was enacted in 1934 with the intent to “curtail 
if not prohibit, transactions in NFA firearms”. (BATFE, 2009) These firearms are defined 
as destructive devices, silencers, machine guns, or short-barreled shotguns and short- 
barreled rifles (i.e. those firearms with barrels less than 18 inches long) and certain firearms 
described  “as any other weapon” (typically meant to include firearms other than handguns 
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that could be concealed). In addition the law designated certain firearm or device parts as 
equivalent in terms of regulation to the device or firearm itself, for example a fire control 
device to switch action between semi and full auto is considered a machine gun. The NFA 
did not outlaw the possession of these weapons. NFA weapons may be purchased from a 
Class 3 firearms dealer following a thorough background check, fingerprinting, 
endorsement from the Chief Law Enforcement Officer in purchaser’s area, and payment of 
a $200 tax on each transfer and requires registration of the weapon with the BATFE. 
(BATFE, 2005). The NFA also provided regulations for manufacturers, importers, and 
dealers of these items. In passage of the law, because of Congress’ concern about the use of 
these weapons in gangland violence, a $200 tax was imposed on the transfer of these 
weapons in the hopes of dissuading individuals from purchasing them. The law spelled out 
a duty for those who transfer or who were possessors of NFA firearms to register these 
weapons and pay the tax. Because the intent of the law was to curtail ownership, the 
BATFE, after NFA weapons owners made good faith attempts to register these weapons, 
forwarded registration information on the owners to the state authorities who then 
prosecuted the owners for state law weapons violations (BATFE, 2005).  
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the act of registration violated the 5
th
 
amendment against self-incrimination, so an amendment to the NFA was crafted to address 
this issue and other ambiguities, the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968 (BATFE, 2009). This 
extensive law also defined who may import, export, and transfer (herein defined as 
including delivery, trade, barter, sale, give, and transport) weapons, the licensing process 
and regulations for Federal Firearms Licensees, and who may legally receive weapons. 
This includes definitions of age and in-state residency requirements as it generally prohibits 
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interstate transfers, even amongst private individuals unless through a FFL, and prohibited 
the possession of handguns by those under 21 years of age.  
The law also defines which individuals are prohibited from possessing firearms. 
These are described as anyone under indictment or a convicted felon, a fugitive from 
justice, an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance, those adjudicated as a 
mental defective or committed to any mental institution, anyone illegally in the United 
States, those dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, who renounced their 
citizenship, or are subject to a restraining order or convicted or a misdemeanor domestic 
violence offense (BATFE, 2005). That same year the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 prohibited interstate trade in handguns i.e. a resident from one state 
purchasing a handgun in another state and increased the minimum age for buying a 
handgun to 21 (BATFE, 2005). 
Following the 1982 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the 2
nd
 Amendment, the 
Firearm Owners Protection Act was enacted in 1986 to address some of the abuses of 
second amendment rights by improper prosecutions by the BATFE. While it loosened some 
restrictions on gun rights, like the interstate shipment of ammunition and long guns, one 
important revision was that it prohibited the possession or transfer of a machine gun by a 
non-licensee (with military and law enforcement exceptions) that was not registered (as an 
NFA weapon) prior to May 19, 1986. This law had a dramatic effect on the price of pre-ban 
machine guns, inflating their price to many times their true value, changing the market 
features related to transferring these weapons. In order to prevent harassment of FFLs the 
law also mandated that compliance inspections could only be conducted once a year. The 
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law also established that the U.S. government may not keep any registry linking non-NFA 
firearms to their owners or firearms transactions (BATFE, 2005).  
However, it wasn’t until the failed assassination attempt on President Ronald 
Reagan that a mechanism was put in place to prevent the purchase, or more inclusively the 
transfer, of firearms to the prohibited individuals defined in the Gun Control Act. This 
came about with the passage of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in 1993. It 
required all prospective firearms purchasers to submit to a background check, initiated by 
an FFL, and a five day waiting period. The National Rifle Association (NRA) opposed 
some conditions of the bill and in concession the waiting period was removed in 1998 and 
replaced by a computerized instant check system. As use of the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS), managed by the FBI, became common, most checks 
are completed within minutes, although delays in confirming eligibility may result in no 
more than a three day waiting period. However the background check can be waived with 
certain exceptions like possession of state issued handgun permits, concealed weapon 
permits, or evidence of other local or state checks. The Brady Act prevents thousands of 
prohibited individuals from possessing firearms each year and over 100 million NICS 
checks have been performed over the past ten years resulting in the prevention of over 
700,000 firearms transfers. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). 
In 1994, The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was passed, 
containing what is commonly called the Assault Weapons Ban. The law was in place for 
ten years and expired in 2004. The law banned the possession and transfer of semi-
automatic rifles and machine pistols after the date of the enactment. The weapons were 
defined by manufacturer and model and other rifles were included if they were capable of 
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accepting detachable magazines and possessed two or more of a number of cosmetic 
features including a bayonet lug, telescoping stock, flash hiders, pistol grips, and grenade 
launchers. Pistols with detachable magazine were included if the magazine attached outside 
of the pistol grip, had a threaded barrel for attachments, a barrel shroud, or were a semi-
auto version of a full auto weapon. Shotguns were included if they held more than five 
rounds, had a detachable clip, a pistol grip, or folding stock. The act also specifically 
banned high capacity magazines, defined as 10 rounds or more. During the ban, 
manufacture, except for military or law enforcement purposes, was also prohibited but 
remaining stocks of weapons and magazines manufactured before the ban were allowed to 
be sold.  
Proposed Legislative Attempts 
Through the mid 90’s to the present, a number of federal legislative actions were 
submitted in an attempt to limit trafficking, increase sanctions on firearms violators, and 
redefine the illegality of certain items (Library Of Congress, 2011). From 2008 to the 
present, examples of bills include: 
 Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act that sought to increase funding for 
BATFE’s Project Gunrunner 
 Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act that sought to increase funding 
to investigate firearms trafficking and other unlawful activities on the Southwest 
border 
 Gun Parts Trafficking Act that sought to make it illegal for anyone other than a 
manufacturer to assemble a firearm, prohibit shipping of gun parts that might be 
used to make a firearm, and increase the cost of manufacturers’ licenses 
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 Gun Trafficking Penalties Enhancement Act that sought to increase the penalties of 
anyone who should have known a transfer was to a prohibited person, attempting to 
transfer a firearm knowing it will be used in a crime, traveling to another state to 
procure a firearm to use it in a crime, and being illegally engaged in the 
importation, manufacture or dealing in firearms, and to include firearms trafficking 
as a RICO offense 
 Internet Gun Trafficking Act that sought to make offering a firearm for sale on the 
internet or operating a website that was primarily offering firearms for sale illegal 
 End Gun Trafficking Act that sought to prohibit selling more than one firearm or 
attempting to buy more than one firearm in a 30 day period and increase the 
retention of background check records for three months 
 Anti-Gun Trafficking Act that sought to prevent an individual from purchasing 
more than two firearms in a 30 day period and require dealers to submit a copy of 
the sellers identification and statement he is not a felon to the Chief Law 
Enforcement Officer in the purchaser’s area  
 Stop Gun Trafficking Act that sought to prohibit more than two hand gun sales in a 
30 day period and modify the meaning of “engaged in business” to include any 
individual who transfers more than one handgun to a non-licensee in a 30 day 
period  
There are a number of other bills similar in content and intent.  They also share the fact that 
none have moved past committee (Library of Congress, 2011), precisely because of the 
political nature of enacting gun laws. A Republican controlled Congress dare not pass any 
laws restricting firearms so as to avoid the lobbying wrath of the NRA. 
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Literature Review 
Low Level Trafficking and Street Crime 
The extent of trafficking needs to be assessed at different levels to facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the efforts already being made and the level of effectiveness 
evidenced from them. Each of the different levels of trafficking will have features unique to 
their level. They may vary as to the means employed to obtain firearms and differences in 
the procurers and end users. 
Low levels of trafficking may be the most common form of trafficking but the 
hardest to detect and stop. This level of trafficking will simply entail providing a few 
firearms or even a single firearm that is illegal to possess. Two conditions define this 
illegality and are an underlying component of all levels of trafficking. The status of the 
receiver makes it illegal for them to possess the firearm, as in the case of felons, the 
mentally ill, or those convicted of domestic violence offenses or the type of weapon 
transferred to them is such that without proper documentation, it is illegal to possess 
(BATFE, 2005). At this low level, the receiver of the firearms may simply be looking to 
obtain a firearm so as to facilitate the commission of additional crimes, for protection, or 
simply because they desire to own a firearm but are restricted from doing so. Theft through 
robberies or burglaries can be a means of obtaining firearms and conventional law 
enforcement techniques can be utilized in order to address this procurement means both 
proactively and retroactively (NIJ, 1997).  
However the use of straw buyers provides an additional challenge to enforcement 
and detection because the nature of the straw buy, or purchase, is innocuous. Straw 
purchases occur on the premises of gun shops, sporting goods stores, pawn shops, and gun 
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shows. As The BATFE defines it “A “straw purchase” occurs when the actual buyer of a 
firearm uses another person, the “straw purchaser,” to execute the paperwork necessary to 
purchase a firearm from an FFL. Specifically, the actual buyer uses the straw purchaser to 
execute the firearms transaction record, purporting to show that the straw purchaser is the 
actual purchaser of the firearm. Often, a straw purchaser is used because the actual 
purchaser is prohibited from acquiring the firearm because of a felony conviction or 
another disability” (BATFE, 1999, p. 7).  
As noted above, the Brady Act requires passing a background check on purchasers 
before a firearm is transferred to them. This is a requirement only when purchasing from an 
FFL, not between non-licensees. After a five year study of gun shows, in 1999 the BATFE 
determined that while FFLs make up 50% to 75% of vendors at gun shows, many 
collectors and gun enthusiasts, who are usually non-licensees, use these venues to trade, 
buy and sell firearms (BATFE, 1999). The Clinton administration was concerned that a gun 
show loophole exists in that there were no mechanisms to insure that non licensees were 
not transferring firearms to prohibited persons. Other concerns include straw buys through 
FFLs, FFLs selling to out of state residents, FFL transactions without background checks, 
and the sale of semi-auto to full-auto conversion kits. (BATFE, 1999).   
For their 1999 study, the BATFE conducted 314 investigations at, and involving, 
gun shows. They found that more than half of the investigations involved being engaged in 
the business without a license, 46% of the investigations involved felons buying or selling 
firearms, 20% involved FFLs selling “off the books”, 15% involved selling to prohibited 
individuals, and 20% involved violations of the National Firearms Act (i.e. Class 3 
weapons). Their report also suggests some remedies for some of these scenarios, including 
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regulation and registration of gun shows, refined definitions of “engaging in business”, 
requiring that all transfers require an FFL conducted background check, and educating gun 
owners and collectors on the law. Federal law would not affect any jurisdictions with more 
restrictive existing state law. While the BATFE considers gun shows “as a venue for 
criminal activity and a source of firearms used in crime” (BATFE, 1999 p. 7) there are 
other means of obtaining firearms. Illegally trafficked guns frequently end up being used in 
crime (BATFE, 1999) and an exploration of the use of these “crime guns” and who 
possesses them is warranted.  
In 1997 the National Institute of Justice through the Drug Use Forecasting program 
developed a study of the characteristics of illegal firearm use and the offenders involved. 
The program interviewed more than 7,000 arrestees from 11 major urban areas concerning 
the access, availability, and reasons for possessing the firearms. In terms of their sample, 
55% were black and one-third tested positive for cocaine. 37% of the arrestees reported 
owning a firearm. Some sites included juveniles in the sample and of those, gang 
membership varied widely by site from 2% to 41%. The study found that among the survey 
respondents, 14% carried a gun all or most of the time. For juvenile males and gang 
members, the proportion was higher (20% and 31% respectively). They found no 
correlation between carrying a gun and drug use and no discernible differences in age or 
gender and firearm ownership. The study also demonstrated that 13% of the arrestees 
admitted to stealing a firearm, confirming their previous research suggesting theft was a 
significant means of obtaining firearms (NIJ, 1997). Overall, 23% of arrestees admitted to 
owning a gun in order to commit crimes. The proportion was higher among gang members 
with 50% admitting to owning for that purpose.   
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These arrestees were also victims of gun violence with between 59% and 75% 
stating that they had been threatened, shot at, or injured with a gun and high percentages 
reported carrying a gun for protection. Violent attitudes were also prevalent; notable 
percentages feel they get respect from peers by carrying a gun. Both drug sellers and gang 
members stated that it is ok to shoot someone who disrespects you (21% and 34% 
respectively). They reported much higher percentages regarding whether it was ok to shoot 
someone who hurt you. The study suggests that police programs similar to the one used in 
the Kansas City Gun Experiment and other firearm suppression programs designed to limit 
access of firearms to youths may be beneficial. They also suggest firearms traces and 
destruction as a way to limit access and transfers. Co-operation amongst law enforcement 
and post release correctional services in premises search programs and hot spot policing 
were also recommended. The general consensus of the 1997 NIJ report was that the 
arrestees in their sample found firearms relatively easy to obtain.   
A 2008 investigative report by WCVB in Boston supports this consensus. While 
Massachusetts has some of the nation most restrictive gun laws, the laws have done little to 
restrict illegal access to firearms. Following months of interviews with police, prosecutors 
and criminals, the investigative news team for WCVB determined that many criminals 
could get access to a gun in just a few minutes, and that they see evidence of “community 
guns”, guns stashed around the neighborhood available for anyone to use (Kelly, 2008). 
Boston police officials state that it’s not a problem of a few large dealers but many small 
street level dealers that help account for the 4000 gun crimes a year in Massachusetts. The 
investigative report also noted that guns were coming from places as far away as Alabama 
to be sold on the streets and that dealers at gun shows were willing to look the other way on 
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questionable transactions. Federal convictions against traffickers and dealers were down 
50% from the previous year but the BATFE Acting Director states that it is not because his 
agency has been less aggressive but that they are pushing more cases to the state level 
(Kelly, 2008). 
Trafficking patterns similar to what were observed in Boston were also found 
nationwide. A Brown University study from 2010 examined BATFE gun tracing data and 
gun laws in the different states. They found that the flow of guns later traced to crimes 
demonstrated that the guns were trafficked from states with weak gun laws to those states 
in a relatively close proximity with strong gun laws. 
Gang involvement and mid- level trafficking 
That gang members were evidenced to be highly likely to carry and use a gun 
necessitates the examination to what degree gangs are involved in trafficking. Street and 
motorcycle gangs have traditionally been involved in illegal activities which necessitates 
the use of violence to manage, maintain, protect, and expand these activities. While it has 
been shown that American and Latin American gangs use guns far more than gangs in 
other countries, there is still limited information on how they purchase, acquire and 
transport weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2010). In May 2011, a 2 ½ year investigation 
involving the FBI, state, and local officials culminated in dozens of arrests of gang 
members with ties to the Mexican Mafia, a well-established prison gang that is deeply 
involved in drugs and weapons trafficking (AP, 2011). Operation Black Flag sought to take 
down the leader of the Mexican Mafia, which had enormous influence over Hispanic gangs 
in Orange County, California. Law enforcement officials stated the gang was “calling the 
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shots” when it came to narcotics, extortion and other crimes, with local gangs connected to 
or paying tribute to the Mexican Mafia (Frere, 2011).  
Trafficking by gangs has a nationwide scope and trafficking enforcement and 
interdiction typically involves multiple agencies. The DEA and Connecticut State Police, 
with the assistance of the BATFE, in an 18 month investigation were able to secure 
indictments against members and associates of the Diablos motorcycle gang for narcotics 
and weapons trafficking (DEA, 2005), though no significant amount of firearms were 
recovered. Trafficking investigations typically involve undercover work and confidential 
informants. An undercover agent with the BATFE infiltrated the Hells Angels in 2003 
which resulted in dozens of members being arrested for narcotics, weapons charges, and 
murder for hire (Arizona Republic, 2005).  
A report from the National Gang Intelligence Center indicates that there are 
members of almost every major street and motorcycle gang currently serving in the U.S. 
military and that they may account for much of the widespread theft of military weapons 
and equipment from installations. Weapons ranging from grenades, machine guns, assault 
rifles, handguns, and explosives are sold on the black market to gun dealers, criminals, and 
gang members (NGIC, 2007).  
Street gang members and their associates will provide firearms locally and out-of-
state to other gangs. A 2004 piece for the Chicago Tribune recounts how a Gangster 
Disciple in Mississippi arranged for straw purchases in the Mississippi Delta region, where 
firearms were relatively easy to purchase. The guns were then run up to Chicago to supply 
the Mickey Cobra gang in their turf war. Handguns are not as easy to obtain in Illinois. The 
law requires a firearm owner’s permit and a 3 day waiting period besides the requirement 
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of federal law. In this case, as in others, 9 mm semi-auto pistols seem to be the most 
popular commodity (Heinzmann, 2004). This is likely because of the wide variety of 
models that have been produced in this caliber, the low cost even for high quality models, 
higher capacity magazines, and reasonably priced ammunition (Heley, personal 
knowledge).  
However, it is not only street criminals and gang members who are cashing in on a 
lucrative black market. The trade can contribute to corruption of law enforcement as well. 
As part of a larger investigation, eight former and current NYPD officers were charged 
with weapons trafficking violations after they purchased weapons, including an M4 assault 
rifle, from an undercover FBI agent, filed off the serial numbers and transported them 
across state lines for sale (Signore, 2011). The report stated that the officers were “paid 
handsomely” for their part in the conspiracy (Signore, 2011). 
High Level Trafficking 
Corruption stemming from trafficking also extends into high level trafficking. The 
mayor, police chief, and a city councilman in Columbus, New Mexico, a small village near 
an area of the Mexican border marred by cross border drug trafficking violence, were 
recently charged with narcotics and weapons trafficking violations (AP, 2011). 
Higher levels of trafficking were examined by the Violence Policy Center. In 2009 
they examined the trafficking of firearms to Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs). Their study of 21 federal firearms prosecutions involving over 1,700 firearms in 
Texas, Arizona, California, and Nevada over a three year period showed that Texas, 
Arizona, and California, respectively, are the primary source of firearms trafficked to 
DTOs. They found that preferred weapons of the DTOs, according to BATFE 
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Congressional testimony, are the Barrett .50-caliber rifle, AR-15 and AK-47 variants and 
the FN 5.57-caliber pistols. They suggest that a three pronged approach be undertaken. 
They called for increased restrictions on military style weapon manufacture and 
distribution, increased regulation of FFLs since they appear to be a major source of the 
weapons crossing the border, and improved buyer qualification procedures (Violence 
Policy Center, 2009). The southern border of the United States continues to be a significant 
location of trafficking. In 2011, U.S. authorities arrested 17 U.S. citizens and legal 
residents in the Phoenix, Arizona area in a scheme that saw them making straw buys in 
Arizona with the intent of selling the weapons, which include AK-47 assault rifles to the 
Sinaloa cartel in Mexico (AP, 2011).   
Mexico isn’t the only destination south of the border that is served by trafficking 
operations in the U.S. Six people were arrested following a discovery of a weapons cache 
in Miami. The traffickers sought to ship weapons and ammunition disguised in appliance 
crates and transported in shipping containers to Venezuela for the purpose of arming both 
sides of the conflict in Columbia. It was reported that one ringleader bragged that he had 
moved over 4 million dollars in munitions and could make others rich too. The operation 
was believed to have moved over 30 shipping containers to South American over the past 2 
years. The discovery of the cache netted handguns, automatic weapons, and over 200,000 
rounds of ammunition (South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 2004).  
However, there may be other sources of weapons that are supplying conflicts in 
South and Central America. The North American Congress on Latin America study in 2008 
found that besides weapons caches left over from the days when Russia and the U.S. were 
arming the various factions in Latin America, legal U.S. weapons shipments to South 
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American countries have been diverted toward insurgent groups. However, the study also 
reports that the Mexican government estimates that 2,000 firearms a day are crossing the 
border from the U.S., where weapons reportedly sell for three times their U.S. market value 
(Stahl and Tuttle, 2008). The Government Accounting Office’s 2009 report found that most 
of the firearms entering Mexico illegally are transported by personal or commercial 
vehicles through border crossings because of the high degree of success they have in it, and 
are facilitated and managed by Mexican DTO’s or their associates. Once in Mexico they 
are distributed in border towns for later pickup or trafficked to other locations. The main 
routes from Texas are through McAllen, El Paso, and Laredo, while Nogales, Arizona, and 
San Diego, California are also trafficking routes (GAO, 2009). 
Cross-border trafficking isn’t limited to south of the border. Gillis’ 2005 report 
indicates that in the past five years, Canadian officials have seized more than 5,400 
firearms coming into the country from the U.S., providing a major supply of weapons for 
Canadian criminal gangs. Canadian officials are utilizing a multi-million dollar piece of 
contraband detection equipment, the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) in an 
attempt to stem the flow of weapons into the country, which the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police’s (RCMP) National Weapons Support Team states accounts for 94% of the crime 
guns recovered in Vancouver in 2003 (Gillis, 2005). Canadian officials have traced some 
guns as originating in places as far away as Georgia and have also seized firearms that are 
being carried overland by individuals. In 2004, Canadian police requested 1,135 traces 
from the BATFE on guns seized during criminal investigations. They note an increase in 
military type weapons seizures as well. Canadian officials also noted that efforts to stem 
trafficking north of the border are hampered by an apparent lack of interest in Canadian 
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concerns about the smuggling and a lack of funding for the BATFE anti-smuggling 
operations (Gillis, 2005).  
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police conducted a study in 2007 and determined 
that the primary sources of smuggled firearms and firearm parts were the U.S. They also 
noted larger numbers of firearms are being seized per investigation, and that firearm 
preferences varied by location. In 2006, over 90% of firearms seized originated or were 
transported from the U.S. They report that most of the firearms are transported across land 
routes at points of entry. Seizures in British Columbia usually originated in Washington, in 
Alberta; origins included Washington, Idaho, and California, while in Ontario, weapons 
originated in Florida, Georgia, and Ohio. Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maryland were 
key sources for guns in Quebec, while an increasing number of firearms are being 
transported across the New Brunswick/Maine border. During the first three quarters of 
2007, of the more than 3,800 guns seized, 52% were crime guns. Rural areas tended to 
exhibit long gun usage in crimes but in urban areas, the preferred weapons were handguns, 
often semi-auto pistols. Most firearms smuggled were higher-end semi-auto pistols which 
are commonly traded for narcotics and sell for three times their retail price. The RMCP 
notes that they have seen a recent increase in the seizure of assault rifles and fully 
automatic submachine guns (2007). 
However in 2008, smuggling was noted to be down along the Northern border but 
the number of violent incidents between border agents and smugglers have increased, 
according to the Border Patrol, because of the success they are having against smugglers. 
Border security measures had increased threefold following the 9/11 attacks but officials 
23 
 
noted that while smugglers can no longer operate with impunity, the smuggling routes are 
always changing. (LA Times, 2008). 
Besides supplying weapons to street criminals, gangs, and cartels, there is also a 
market for supplying weapons to terrorist organizations. In a sting operation, a former NYC 
high school teacher was arrested for his part in supplying small arms to undercover agents 
he believed were connected to Hamas and Hezbollah. While the suspect did exhibit support 
for the terrorist organization goals, profit was again a driving factor (Auer, Gonen, & 
Crudele, 2010). 
Role of the BATFE  
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (formerly the ATF and 
formerly with the Treasury Dept.) has positioned itself at the forefront of combating illegal 
firearms trafficking. Its first incarnation was a unit in the Bureau of Internal Revenue but 
following the passage of the 1968 Gun Control Act, the ATF was established in 1972 as a 
separate bureau in the Treasury Department. Currently under the Department of Justice, 
they utilize FFL compliance and active investigation to limit trafficking (BATFE, 2011). In 
2010 The Bureau employed 2508 Special Agents and 624 industry investigators, with a 
direct budget authority of slightly over one billion dollars. (BATFE, 2011).  
Historically, the Bureau has suffered from image problems in part because of the 
methods and tactics they use. The book, The BATF’s War On Civil Liberties: The Assault 
On Gun Owners (Hardy, 1979), describes how the Bureau routinely used coercive tactics 
and entrapment to obtain arrests and convictions. Some examples: Agents would approach 
non-licensees at gun shows and offer to pay an inflated price for a firearm in a personal 
collection or agents would ask a non-licensee to check with other collectors in order to 
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obtain a desired firearm, paying them for the trouble. If the non-licensee accepted, they 
were charged with “engaging in the business” of being a firearm dealer as the income 
provided for the firearms was proof of profit. Likewise, having a collector obtain a firearm 
not in their own collection is deemed “engaging in the business”. People charged with 
minor firearm offenses were coerced through threats to induce others to commit firearms 
violations to increase firearms cases.  
Indeed, the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee on the Second Amendment concluded 
that following the passage of the 1968 Gun Control Act, which was intended to prevent 
access to illegal weapons and access to felons, the “over breadth of the law has led to 
neglect of precisely this area of enforcement” (1982). The Bureau’s records showed over 
recent years that “55% of its gun law prosecutions overall involve persons with no prior 
felony convictions and one third involve citizens with no prior police contacts at all” 
(1982). 
  The Committee’s report also noted that there was evidence that the Bureau was 
mainly devoting enforcement efforts toward technical violations where the individual had 
no prior criminal intent or knowledge, and that collections confiscated by the Bureau were 
not being returned to the owners upon acquittal. The weapons more commonly confiscated 
seemed not to be crime guns but were more highly valued collector pieces. The Bureau 
changed regulations regarding the legality of straw purchases, did not publish them in the 
Federal Register, then conducted massive sweeps, arresting dealers who had previously 
understood that these sales were legal. A similar scheme involved the law concerning 
recording keeping pertaining to sales from private collections of dealers. While the Bureau 
claimed to be making appropriate cases, they did concede that only 9.8% of their arrests 
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were brought on felons in illegal possession cases, and the value of guns confiscated were 
typically double that of a typical crime gun. In all, “75% of the Bureau’s prosecutions were 
on ordinary citizens who lacked both criminal intent and knowledge and were induced by 
agents into technical violations” (United States Senate, 1982, p. 22). Following the 
subcommittee findings, the Firearms Owner Protection Act of 1986 was passed. It sought 
to correct and repeal portions of the Gun Control Act. One of the most important features 
of the act as it relates to trafficking was that it prevented the establishment of any system of 
registration of firearms, their owners, or firearms transactions. 
More recent documentation also focused on the role of the BATFE. A House 
Judiciary Committee investigated what appeared to be the heavy handed tactics of the 
Bureau at Richmond, Virginia gun shows in 2005. Numerous witnesses complained about 
intimidation from agents when trying to purchase firearms, detentions and interrogations of 
patrons of the show, unjustified firearm confiscations, and intense and intrusive residency 
checks associated with any patron who purchased a firearm at the show. Patrons who 
purchased firearms legally were also mailed letters from the BATFE stating an 
investigation showed they may have violated federal law and are required to appear at the 
BATFE office to answer questions about their purchase or be subject to arrest. While 
BATFE insisted they were only trying to stop straw purchases and keeps guns out of the 
hands of felons, most accounts indicate that the BATFE zealously overstepped their bounds 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). 
The GAO Report on Firearms Trafficking 
In 2009, the Government Accounting Office produced an assessment of the 
challenges the U.S. faces on controlling firearms trafficking into Mexico. In producing the 
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report they called upon the expertise of numerous federal agencies including the BATFE. 
While the report states that the number of firearms entering Mexico is unknown, they did 
determine that 87% of the firearms seized by Mexican authorities between 2004 and 2008 
(over 20,000 firearms) originated in the U.S.  68% were manufactured in the U.S., and 19% 
were manufactured in other countries, imported to the U.S. and then trafficked into Mexico. 
The BATFE stated that the three major challenges to stemming illegal traffic are 
restrictions on collecting information on firearms purchases, lack of required background 
checks on private sales, and limitations on reporting multiple sales. The report also found 
that BATFE and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “do  not consistently and 
effectively coordinate their efforts in part because the agencies lack clear roles and 
responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency agreement” (GAO, 
2009, p. 3). This included not informing ICE of “controlled delivery operations” (covert 
operations to identify organizations in Mexico receiving illegal weapons) and a lack of 
cooperation between ICE and BATFE at the gun desk of the El Paso Intelligence Center.  
An additional hindrance was the fact that agencies lack any kind of systematic 
analysis and data reporting that could be used to assess the effectiveness of their efforts. 
The agencies did not have any complete data on the amount and sources of guns trafficked, 
cases initiated, or prosecutions resulting from investigations. Still more challenges to 
effective enforcement were a lack of funds dedicated to arms trafficking, the establishment 
of multiagency task forces was lacking, and the Mexican government’s use of the BATFE 
tool E-Trace is hampered by a Spanish language version that had yet to be developed and 
deployed. The report recommends that there be increased data analysis to determine trends 
and trafficking data, Department of Homeland Security oversight of the efforts of BATFE 
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& ICE to insure they share data and utilize each other as resources, and the efforts of the 
agencies be analyzed and data collected on their efforts (GAO, 2009). 
The report also detailed the most common weapons seized in Mexico and stated that 
U.S. military weapons only accounted for .7% of weapons seized in Mexico. The BATFE 
concluded for the report that, besides the straw purchases taking place, that a small number 
of corrupt FFLs or their employees facilitate illegal transfers (GAO, 2009). However the 
BATFE has no data to demonstrate what percentage of firearms were trafficked to Mexico 
because of straw purchases or corrupt dealers, let alone purchases from gun shows. 
The GAO report also brings to light the interagency coordination that BATFE will 
have to establish and maintain both with ICE and with DEA and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), who are responsible for the ports of entry in the U.S. CBP’s role was 
shown to be underutilized as officials report that “southbound inspections of vehicle and 
persons has not been a high priority for the U.S. Government and have resulted in relatively 
few weapons seizures” (GAO, 2009, p. 24). In 2008, CBP reported only 35 total 
southbound weapons seizures at 10 of the 25 southern points of entry, netting only 70 
weapons. These southbound ports of entry are also shown to lack resources and 
infrastructure to adequately inspect vehicles. Overall the GAO report indicates that there 
simply is not a strategic plan with a focus on arms trafficking to Mexico. The BATFE’s 
plan for 2004-2009 “does not mention arms trafficking to Mexico” (GAO, 2009, p. 52), 
though the BATFE did state their new Strategic Plan would focus on this issue. Both 
BATFE and ICE developed plans to deal with arms trafficking, Project Gun Runner and 
Project Armas Cruzadas, respectively. Missing from both plans are means to ensure 
progress is being made toward the strategic goals. CBP doesn’t address any particular goals 
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at limiting arms trafficking and though the Office of National Drug Control Policy in its 
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy did mention arms trafficking “it did 
not contain key elements of an effective strategy” (GAO 2009, p. 54). 
BATFE Strategic Plan 2010-2016 
In 2009, the BATFE released it Strategic Plan 2010-2016. It contained four core 
mission focuses-illegal arms trafficking, criminal groups and gangs, 
explosives/bombs/bombings, and fire and arson. In regards to trafficking, the Bureau 
recognizes the threat that trafficking into Mexico poses and they also mention that illegal 
trafficking via the internet is a problem that deserves their focus. The main effort to address 
southern border trafficking is Project Gunrunner. The Project is a DOJ interagency effort to 
reduce violence and trafficking. Described as a “forceful strategy”, the BATFE’s primary 
role “is to stem the trafficking of illegal weapons across the border and to reduce the 
firearms driven violence occurring on both sides of the border” (BATFE, 2009, p.6). In 
order to maintain safety in our communities and national security the Bureau is utilizing the 
Integrated Violence Reduction Strategy. The strategy as stated is “to remove violent 
offenders from our communities, keep firearms from prohibited possessors, eliminate 
illegal weapons transfers, and prevent firearms violence through community outreach. 
IVRS builds upon traditional law enforcement efforts with the use of state-of–the-art 
technology, intelligence and information sharing, industry regulation, and community 
outreach” (BATFE, 2009, p.6). The strategic goal of the BATFE, specifically stated, is as 
follows:  
Strategic Goal-Reduce violent firearms crimes by strengthening firearms trafficking 
intelligence gathering, analysis, inspection and investigative activity. 
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Strategic Objective 1:  Interdict and prevent illegal firearm trafficking 
Strategies:  
 Develop Integrated Firearms Enforcement Teams-utilized in source and trafficking 
areas 
 Expand Risk Based Approach To Inspections-achieving a three periodic inspection 
cycle 
 Enhance Use of Internet Trafficking Units 
 Increase Targeted Import Inspections 
 Increase ATF’s Illegal Firearms Trafficking And Technical Training 
 Advance Uniformity In Crime Gun Recovery Protocols   
 Expand Awareness And Outreach-at the internet and guns shows 
 Improve Inventory Control Of Firearms Licensees 
Strategic Objective 2:  Lead the advancement of illegal firearms trafficking intelligence 
capability through comprehensive information management and research in emerging 
technology. 
Strategies: 
 Establish A Comprehensive Firearms Tracing Program 
 Modernize And Integrate Firearms Database 
 Increase Participation In State Fusion Centers 
 Enhance Partnerships With Academia 
 Increase Research And Development In Firearms Technology  
Performance Goal-Reduce the risk to public safety caused by illegal firearms trafficking 
(BATFE, 2009, p.11-12). 
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INDICATORS OF TRAFFICKING 
Trace Data 
To afford a better understanding of the nature of trafficking and what weapons are 
likely to be a focus of trafficking, this report examines some of the characteristics of crime 
guns. The BATFE provides some indication through its firearms trace data of the nature of 
crime guns; the types, the states the original purchases of the firearms were from, and their 
time to crime, i.e. the elapsed time from their original purchase from a dealer to the time 
they were recovered and traced. This report examined the BATFE trace data reports of a 
number of specific states; Illinois, New York, & Washington D.C. as they have relatively 
restrictive gun laws, Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, and California because of their 
proximity to the Mexican border, and Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and Minnesota 
because of their proximity to the Canadian border and also Massachusetts for a 
northeastern state, Nevada for its proximity to border states and Florida as a southern state. 
While there is some missing data in the BATFE reports and they only include crime 
guns that were actually recovered and traced, these reports can provide a proxy for firearm 
use in crime. Some generalities are evident, by far the most prevalent firearm documented 
in the reports were pistols, making up 40% to 50% of traced firearms. Roughly one quarter 
of the traced firearms were revolvers in the more urban states like New York and 
Massachusetts. However the second most commonly traced firearms vary by state with 
more rural states like North Dakota, Minnesota, Montana & New Mexico showing higher 
percentages of tracing on rifles and shotguns.  
Machine guns (which would include fully automatic assault rifles) are very rarely 
recovered and traced. For example, in the southern borders states of Texas, California, New 
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Mexico, and Arizona, out of 54,805 traces conducted in 2010, machine guns were involved 
in only 113 traces. This offers further support to the contention that these weapons may not 
require a strong focus from BATFE in regards to their low level trafficking.  
Also showing a clear trend is the time to crime. The average time to crime varies 
between 8 and 13 years with half of the firearms having a time to crime of three years or 
more. Across all the states examined for this report, the average number of firearms with a 
time to crime of three years or less ranged 40% to 50%, for most states. However in the 
states of IL, MA, NY, and Washington D.C. the proportion of firearms with a time to crime 
of three years or less drops to a range of 19% to 26%. This may be an indication that these 
states’ more restrictive laws slow early transfer of guns to crime use (BATFE, 2011). 
BATFE data also indicated what the nature of the situation that prompted the trace. 
While the vast majority of initiatives were related to “possession of a weapon” or “firearm 
under investigation”, there were indications that weapons trafficking prompted some traces. 
In the 14 states examined for this report, of the reported top 10 charges related to 
prompting the trace, “selling weapons” occurred in AZ and WA and “trafficking weapons” 
occurred in MN and MA. However these 1,355 traces only account for 2.5% of all the 
traces from these 14 states (BATFE, 2011). As many of these traces are initiated by local 
law enforcement during the course of a criminal investigation, it would appear that either 
local law enforcement agencies are not encountering trafficking situations frequently, or 
they do not recognize them for what they are. 
Other trends relate to the source of the traced weapons. The BATFE examined each 
state and documented those states’ top 15 firearm origination states that resulted from their 
firearms traces. For the individual states examined in this report, the examined state is the 
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major source for the traced firearm and no one origin state provided more firearms than the 
state examined. However, in a few states, like New York, the total number of firearms 
originating from other states exceeds the number of traced firearms originating from the 
examined state itself. It should also be noted that in all of the states examined, firearms 
traces generated hits in almost every state in the country. Related to trafficking, the trends 
show that typically the firearms traced show a pattern of origination in a cluster around the 
examined state. This would indicate that the majority of interstate trafficking is regional in 
nature. There are some noted exceptions. Some far flung states do contribute relatively 
small amounts to the total being traced. For example, in New York, the top 15 origin states 
cluster around New York and the east coast, with the exception of California. There are 
also patterns that extend beyond close proximity clustering. For Illinois, there appears to be 
a stretch of states leading from Illinois down to Florida that account for the majority of 
firearms origination. For Massachusetts, the origination states run the length of the eastern 
seaboard down to Florida while for Texas, contributing states run the length of the southern 
border. Almost all the southern states and up the eastern seaboard into New England are 
origination states for Florida. The data also indicates that of the states examined here, at 
least 25% of the firearms recovered could not be traced to an origin state (BATFE, 2011).   
In light of these trends, we can consider the characteristics of crime guns and the 
circumstances around their tracing as being indicative of the characteristics that may 
surround trafficking. For instance, trafficking may be a regional endeavor that seeks to 
meet a demand for a desired firearm commodity. By examining trends and continuing to 
gather more detailed data, better assessments can be made on the most productive areas of 
focus for law enforcement and can assist in establishing interstate partnerships to address 
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their common regional trafficking issues. It is only with quality assessments of the true 
nature and features of any level of trafficking that the most productive recommendations 
can be forwarded. 
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TRAFFICKING ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In assessing the different levels of firearms trafficking, a number of enforcement 
efforts and legislative remedies have been applied at all levels. For example, on June, 2011, 
Senators Feinstein, Schumer, and Whitehouse delivered a report to the Senate Caucus on 
International Narcotics Control regarding halting illegal firearms trafficking to Mexico. 
Their recommendations called for Congress to 1) require background checks on all firearm 
purchases, including those at gun shows, 2) ban the import of assault weapons under the 
GCA provision that they are unsuitable for sporting purposes, 3) renew the assault weapons 
ban, 4) require all multiple sales of firearms be reported to the BATFE, and 5) ratify the 
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking of 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA). While they 
presented their proposal as a means to address high level trafficking, some of the 
recommendations can be directed at other levels of trafficking. However while some of the 
efforts and remedies may be appropriate at one level they may be ineffective at another as 
will be demonstrated. After examining some of the goals set out by the Bureau in their 
FY2010-2016 Strategic Plan and other performance indicators it should be noted that while 
the Bureau has specific strategies and performance indicators listed, there is little detail 
provided as to how they will accomplish the strategies or what bench marks should be 
established for their performance indicators. The performance of the BATFE, both in its 
strengths and weaknesses, can affect multiple levels of trafficking and while some of its 
programs and efforts are applicable to all levels of trafficking some are more level specific. 
In the following assessments and recommendations section, efforts and legislation 
that crosses over and is applicable to multiple levels of trafficking will be noted. It also 
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must be noted that germane to the issue of legislative efforts is the recognition of both the 
“gun community” and “gun lobby”. The author defines the gun community as a collection 
of hunters, target shooters, gun enthusiasts and collectors, NRA and other gun rights group 
members, and firearms dealers who strongly support the second amendment and are very 
sensitive to perceived attacks on it. They are aware of firearms law issues, are active at the 
polls, and can be moved to political action in a variety of ways. The gun lobby will be 
defined as those organizations, specifically the NRA and firearms manufacturers, that 
attempt to influence policy and laws regarding the control and manufacture of firearms.  
In considering any legislation, the influence the NRA carries when it comes to 
passing, amending, or preventing the passage, of gun laws has to be recognized. Even 
mildly restrictive amendments to existing law will be met with strong protest from both the 
gun community and gun lobby as evidenced by the years of delay in implementing the 
Brady Bill that requires background checks for firearms purchases from FFL dealers and 
the continued resistance to pass multiple long gun sales reporting requirements (Serrano, 
2011). Efforts made in this area must take this into account in crafting and promoting these 
laws, regardless of the level of trafficking it is meant to address. 
Low Level Firearms Trafficking Assessment 
Federal Legislation 
As a legislative consideration to address low level trafficking, re-instating the 
Assault Weapons Ban is not an effective remedy to limit trafficking at this level. Originally 
the law intended that violent crime could be reduced by preventing access to these 
weapons. However, after all the effort put into crafting and passing the law, it had little 
effect on violent crime, primarily because their use in street crime was minimal, as 
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confirmed by Koper and Roth (2001). Their study showed that assault weapon use 
constitutes only 2% of all gun crimes and the ban had no significant effect on the number 
of gun homicides, the number of victims per incident, or the number of wounds per victim 
(Koper and Roth, 2001). Thus reinstituting the Assault Weapons Ban is not supported in 
terms of limiting injury in street crime and it will likely have little effect on the low level 
trafficking of these weapons, as low level trafficking will primarily provide firearms for 
street crime use, where handguns are preferred. 
The Feinstein et al proposal suggested background checks on all individuals who 
purchase firearms, including those purchases at gun shows, as a way to stop trafficking to 
DTO’s. Attempts have been made in the past to close what it often referred to as the “gun 
show loophole” in that a non-licensee can go to a gun show and purchase a firearm from 
another non-licensee and not have to submit to a background check. The gun show 
loophole has been an issue since the Clinton Administration; however at that time the 
concern wasn’t DTOs but rather that felons could illegally obtain firearms. However, the 
idea of a “loophole” should be examined more closely.  Currently there is nothing to 
prohibit non-licensees from selling firearms to one another, regardless of whether it takes 
place at a flea market, a gun show, or in a garage and there never has been. Simply selling a 
firearm doesn’t put the seller in a category of “doing business” as a dealer and does not 
subject them to BATFE regulation. While it’s true that gun shows are in essence a market 
place for guns, the nature of the vendors at the shows has to be considered when 
determining the availability of firearms to prohibited persons at gun shows. In the author’s 
experience at numerous gun shows in California, Texas, North Dakota, and Minnesota, the 
large majority of the firearms vendors are FFL dealers who are required by law to conduct 
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a background check, regardless of where they sell the firearm, and they must attend to state 
residency requirements regarding firearms sales. A significant portion of vendors are 
collectors who display their collections, which often include higher end and antique 
firearms, and are not in the habit of selling off parts of their collection frivolously. This 
leaves a relatively small percentage of vendors who have a few firearms to sell and vendors 
who likely operate under the table as dealers. However, in terms of determining the 
illegality of transfers to prohibited individuals, the non-licensee seller must be aware the 
buyer is prohibited from possessing a firearm. This is something that may not be offered up 
by the individual attempting to purchase the firearm and it will be necessary to demonstrate 
the seller had this knowledge to determine if a crime occurred on the part of the seller. 
Feinstein, Schumer, and Whitehouse’s recommendations would make background checks 
required for all firearms purchases but the feasibility of such a measure has to be 
considered in terms of how well it can be enforced between two private individuals, the 
record keeping requirements of the individuals involved, whether as individuals they will 
be subjected to possibly warrantless checks of documentation, and how it will apply in a 
variety of contexts, including gifting a firearm in lieu of a sale.  
For a law requiring background checks of all firearms sales between non licensees 
to be useful in trafficking it will have to include some record keeping and enforcement 
details. In an FFL sale, the serial number trace can only show what dealer possessed the 
gun prior to its original sale and who the dealer made the original sale to. This occurs only 
because of the record keeping requirements made on the dealer. Following that, standard 
investigative techniques (e.g. interviews and interrogations) are the only way to further 
trace the gun’s history. Without the necessary mechanisms to manage and enforce the law, 
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a universal background check mandate it will do nothing to limit or stop trafficking on any 
level. To be effective as a tool against trafficking, the law would need all firearms to be 
registered and that all firearms owners comply with reporting requirements. However, the 
GCA prevents the establishment of any kind of database involving or requiring the 
registration of non-NFA firearms. The gun community is very wary of any attempt to 
establish registration of firearms as it is seen as a mechanism to facilitate firearms 
confiscation. In the author’s assessment, the likelihood of the gun community complying 
with such a federal law (considering how the gun community in general feels about federal 
regulation of firearms) is slight and without an actual database of firearms on which 
violations of the law can be determined, the sheer number of firearms in the U.S. would 
render such a law useless in limiting trafficking at any level. 
State Legislation    
Because of the strength of the gun lobby in Washington D.C. and the strong political 
overtones regarding firearms issues, federal legislation regulating firearms and their 
transfer may be difficult to pass or modify. However a number of states have been able to 
pass firearms laws and laws regulating firearms dealers that are stricter than federal law. 
Illinois and particularly Chicago have some of the most restrictive gun laws in the nation. 
Illinois residents are required to have a firearms owner ID and bans residents from selling 
firearms to anyone who does not possess one and since 1982 Chicago has banned handguns 
except for those already in circulation which were then registered with the city (Cook et al 
2007). Maryland bans the sale, transport, or possession of assault pistols and New Jersey 
requires the specific state licensing for possession of any assault weapon (BATFE, 2011). 
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 One caveat that must be considered in the implementation of state laws limiting 
firearm transfers and possession is that it may foster mid-level trafficking. If the available, 
initially legal supply of firearms becomes difficult to access, it should be expected that 
market forces will seek to reconcile this by the development of illegal firearms sources. 
Thus, while local and state laws may limit low level trafficking, it may provide an 
opportunity for criminal activity to fill the gap of firearms through intra or interstate 
trafficking. This trafficking will require more organization and by virtue of this may 
involve organized criminal elements. 
The Underground Gun Market 
Wright, Wintemute and Webster (2010) examined low level handgun trafficking in 
California. Their analysis included the types of guns and the characteristics of the sellers, 
(defined for the study as dealers, importer/manufacturer or pawnshop) purchases, and the 
purchasers themselves, with their outcome variable as the percent of handguns recovered as 
a crime gun within the three years of its original purchase that was in the possession of 
someone other than the original purchaser. If we accept the authors’ contention that these 
weapons were purchased with gun trafficking in mind, then their data showed that what 
might be considered as straw purchases made up only 0.4 % of handgun purchases in 1996. 
Results showed that of the traced guns recovered in the study, the large majority were 
originally singly purchased, semi auto pistols that cost more than $150 and were purchased 
from a dealer by males. However multiple regression analysis on the 772 firearms that were 
traced exhibited patterns that contribute to their risk of use as a trafficked crime gun. 
Multiple handgun purchases that occurred on the same day were more likely to be traced as 
a crime gun than single purchases or multiple purchases that occurred over 30 days, as 
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were medium caliber (9mm) semi-auto pistols, costing less than $150. These crime guns 
were also more likely to have come from retailers who do high volume gun sales, and have 
relatively high percentages of rejected transfer applications. Females were also twice as 
likely as males to have a gun traced to them as the original owner and the younger the 
original purchaser, the more likely the gun was to be recovered as a crime gun (Wright et 
al, 2010).  
Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh, and Braga (2007) took an in-depth look at low level 
trafficking in a high crime community on the south side of Chicago through interviews and 
statistical analysis. They found the virtual lack of any licensed firearms dealers in the city 
requires residents to travel outside of city limits to purchase a firearm (Cook et al, 2007). A 
system of local gun brokers had developed which act as middle men between the actual gun 
purchasing client and the gun supplier. Their study was able to determine characteristics of 
the gun brokers and of the nature of obtaining firearms (e.g. traces on crime guns in 
Chicago indicated that only about 10% were purchased in Cook County, with about one-
fifth of those guns being purchased by a female, which may be an indication of a straw 
purchase). Other interviewees confirmed they rarely travelled outside of the neighborhood 
to purchase a firearm. Cook et al also report that guns are shared or loaned within the 
community and that legal ownership of a firearm may see that firearm converted to a crime 
gun through this process or through theft (2007).  
Their study showed that while the guns are relatively cheap (the median price for 
the sample was $150), they are not that easily obtained, with almost 62% of those 
individuals in the sample who wanted a gun claiming it would take more than a week to 
obtain one. Because of the limits on firearms dealers and handguns in Chicago, ammunition 
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is also at premium with one interviewee reporting spending $50 for 10 rounds of 9mm 
ammunition where on the legal market he could have purchased 500 rounds for the same 
price (Cook et al, 2007).  
Cook et al postulate this thin gun market may stem from several factors. First there 
was a reluctance of gangs to deal in gun trafficking and the gangs exercised control over 
their members’ firearm possession. There was a fear among gang leaders that increased 
focus from the police pertaining to illegal gun sales and use would disrupt the more 
lucrative drug trafficking enterprises. Police officers admitted that they have received calls 
from gang leaders on confiscation tipoffs involving their own gang members. Officers also 
realized that “there will always be drugs” (Cook et al, 2007, p. 571), but by getting the guns 
off the streets it makes their job easier and reduces homicides. However many youths 
maintain gang membership to retain access to guns, even if regulated by the gang. For non-
gang affiliated interviewees who owned a gun, 40% reported obtaining it from a relative, 
35% reported obtaining one from a gang member, 17% from a licensed security guard and 
6% from a broker.  
Special Operations and Task Forces 
Risk factors for trafficking should be determined individually by local law 
enforcement as, at least in Chicago, gangs may not have much organized involvement in 
low level trafficking as opposed to independent gun brokers. If there is evidence that gangs 
are trafficking firearms, there are local operations that can be effective against them. There 
are indications from interviews in Cook et al’s 2007 piece that programs like Boston’s 
Operation Cease Fire may provide some leverage to be used on street gangs to help stem 
trafficking and crime gun use. According to the NIJ, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire utilized 
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a focused law enforcement effort on gangs, which combined crackdowns on gun crime 
with keeping an open dialogue with gang leaders so that they knew what was expected of 
them. The operation assessed where the guns were coming from and who was obtaining 
them and the working group focused on who was trafficking the guns to Boston street 
gangs. Working closely with the BATFE and taking an intrastate and interstate approach, 
they found that most of the illegal guns trafficked to Boston came from within the state 
(National Institute of Justice, 2011).  
To address a localized trafficking problem, some localities have developed task 
forces. In 1993, the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the U.S. Department of Justice created 
the Firearms Trafficking Program which funded eight demonstration projects around the 
country. Gary, Indiana developed a program that targeted multiple firearm purchasers who 
are linked to criminal elements, and developed intelligence and investigative leads. The 
task force maintained a database of individuals involved in multiple firearm sales and 
recoveries, and review dealer records of multiple sales (BJA, 2000). Virginia, with BJA 
funding, developed three task forces in their state, each based out of a BATFE field office. 
Targets for investigation were developed from the Firearms Transaction Center, the agency 
managing Virginia’s Firearms Transaction Program which provides for background checks 
on buyers and also licenses gun dealers (Virginia State Police, 2011). The task forces were 
generally able to involve dealers as cooperative informants, and suspicious attempts at 
purchase, incomplete purchases, and multiple sales provided investigative leads. The task 
forces attempted traces on all guns recovered during investigations and initiated its own 
investigations into FFLs who did not possess state licenses (BJA, 2000). It should be noted 
that Virginia had state laws in place which assisted in the productivity of the task force. 
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As an example of structure and budget for a task force, in a 2006 report on 
Connecticut’s task force, the report indicated that their Statewide Firearms Trafficking 
Task Force investigates illegal firearms transfers, possessions, and transportation and trace 
all guns seized by law enforcement. In its operation from 2000-2006 the size of the force 
varied between 4 and 9 officers, and only had an ATF liaison its first two years. The task 
force had five officers in 2006 and an operating budget from state funds of $500,000 with 
slightly more than 80% of this funding going to pay for the officers on the task force. The 
task force also received federal grant money. From 2000 to 2005, the task force conducted 
319 investigations, made 189 arrests, seized 495 guns, and inspected 204 firearms dealers 
(Rose, 2006). 
BATFE Activities 
There are a few Bureau efforts that are applicable to all levels of trafficking. Started 
in 2008, the BATFE campaign, “Don’t Lie For The Other Guy” was formed in conjunction 
with the National Shooting Sports Foundation to reduce straw purchases at the retail level, 
educate dealers on recognizing the signs of a potential straw purchase, and educate 
potential straw buyers on the penalties for the offense. It accomplishes this thru a variety of 
media forms, (radio, TV, billboards) and by providing info packs and conducting seminars 
for dealers. The BATFE fact sheet claims that over 34,000 info packs have been sent to 
firearm retailers and they have launched the program in 25 cities, however there is no 
indication if any evaluation of the program has been conducted, whether it has reduced 
straw purchases, or whether it has influenced dealers or patrons to reconsider participating 
in straw purchases. 
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The Bureau has exhibited an interest in teaming with academia to develop 
performance criteria and conduct performance evaluations of programs and to modernize 
its database. By being able to effectively evaluate it programs and improving its 
intelligence capabilities, effective trafficking efforts can be implemented in areas that 
warrant an increased focus. The Bureau also seeks to utilize a risk based approach to 
compliance inspection, expanded investigative capabilities as related to internet trafficking, 
improving FFL inventory control, and increasing trafficking awareness and training for 
dealers and law enforcement, all of which are applicable to the different levels of 
trafficking.  
From an investigative standpoint, a good starting point in illegal firearms trafficking 
is at the source of firearms, thus the FFL dealers should be a focus. Dealers have a wide 
variety of regulatory and exporting mandates. They are currently required to report all 
firearms thefts and all multiple handgun sales. They are required by law to conduct an 
NICS check when transferring a firearm and have to maintain sales and inventory records. 
The BATFE implemented eZ Check in 2000 which requires licensees to verify the status of 
another licensee before making a transfer (BATFE, 2011). 
However it is from corrupt dealers that firearms may be sold off the books, illegal 
or stolen firearms may enter the black-market, and they serve as a source for straw 
purchases and illegal sales. It is typical that a small number of dealers account for a large 
number of traced firearms (Webster, Vernick, and Bulzachelli, 2006). Current law, enacted 
as a reaction to abuses of authority from BATFE inspectors, now limits the ability to 
inspect an individual dealer to once in a 12 month period unless an active criminal 
investigation is ongoing, a warrant is issued, or to assist in tracing firearms. These 
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compliance checks would insure that transactions are being recorded and recorded 
accurately, inventory checks could be made, and premise checks could help verify the 
legitimacy of the dealer. With infrequent inspections it becomes easier to hide diverted or 
“off the books” transfers and suspicious sales by corrupt FFLs and it is harder to generate 
opportunities to foster good relationships with legitimate dealers who can be a source of 
investigative leads. To address questionable dealers, in 2000 the BATFE began requiring 
dealers with 10 or more crime gun related traces with a three year or less time to crime or  
information to the National Tracing Center (BATFE, 2010).  
According to the Congressional Research Service, in 2010, the Bureau employed 
834 Industry Operations Investigators (IOIs) (not including 14 IOIs provided to the 
southwest border by special appropriation) who completed 10,538 inspections that year. 
This amounts to inspections conducted on 8.9% of FFL dealers with investigators 
averaging 12.6 inspections a year, essentially one inspection a month. The Congressional 
Research Service report on the 2011 BATFE budget also states that at a March 2010 CJS 
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, ATF Deputy Director Melson testified that many 
FFLs are not inspected for five years or more because of a lack of ATF personnel (Krouse, 
2011). However BATFE documents report that for 2010, the Bureau had only 624 
investigators initially accounted for in the salaries and expenses appropriations, (BATFE, 
2011) suggesting that the Bureau is partly relying on additional budget allocations and 
appropriations in manning these positions.  
When historical compliance inspection data is examined, the efficiency of the 
investigators varies widely. After 1978, there was no fiscal year where inspections of FFL 
dealers exceeded 10%. At the peak of FFL dealer numbers in 1992, the number of 
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investigators totaled 792 (compared to 791 investigators in 2009), the percentage of 
inspected dealers only totaled 5.7% but investigators were conducting on average 20 
inspections a year. In 2009, the number of inspections totaled 11,375 and investigators only 
conducted on average 14 inspections a year.  
From 1990 to 2010 the number of investigators varied from a low of 702 in 1998 to 
a high of 935 in 2002. The percentage of compliance investigations varied during this 
period from a low of 3 % in 1991 to a high of 9.9% in 2009. It should be noted that it 
appears the BATFE has had an increased focus on inspection with 2007 to 2010 exhibiting 
inspection percentages between 8.9% and 9.9%. However there is no shortage of FFL 
dealers to inspect and increasing the number of inspectors or alternately, increasing the 
number of inspections conducted per year may be beneficial to limiting trafficking.  
Efficiency should be the focus of these efforts. Even when the number of 
investigators was at its peak in 2003 at 940, investigators only inspected 4.9% of FFL 
dealers with investigators averaging only 5.5 inspections a year, less than one every two 
months. This suggest there are no clear guidelines or mandates on how often inspections 
should be done by investigators to insure adequate coverage in compliance inspections or 
concerning the efficiency of the investigators themselves, or alternatively there is a lack of 
adherence to these guidelines and mandates. 
The results of the inspections show that increasing efficiency may be beneficial. In 
2009, of the 11,375 compliance investigation conducted, only 48% of the dealers had no 
violations. Also noted, even though there is a requirement to file with the BATFE if an FFL 
ceases operation, 12.5 % of inspections were conducted on dealers who subsequently were 
shown to be out of business. While these investigations may be necessary as a follow-up, 
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the fact that they constitute over 12% of the inspections may indicate that a more efficient 
means of determining their status is warranted. The BATFE wants to address compliance 
inspection by utilizing a risk based approached to inspections and to “achieve a three-year 
periodic inspection cycle in partnerships with FFLs” (BATFE, 2009 p. 10). It should go 
without saying that considering the vast number of FFL dealers, a risk based approach 
should be utilized, however given the current state of the efficiency of inspections, 
achieving a three-year periodic inspection cycle can only be accomplished by increasing 
the number of investigators and increasing the number of inspections per investigator. 
Part of the BATFE’s 2010-2016 strategic plan called for developing a 
comprehensive firearms tracing system, perhaps signaling the need for improvement in the 
Bureau’s National Tracing Center Division (NTCD). The NTCD was established a number 
of years ago and allows firearms trace requests to be made by any law enforcement agency 
conducting a criminal investigation. They can be requested by phone, fax and also through 
the internet on e-Trace. Besides tracing, the NTCD also assists in analyzing obliterated 
serial numbers, manages reports of stolen firearms from dealers, shipments and the 
military. In addition the NTCD also assists in Out of Business record requests and 
international tracing. (BATFE, 2011). The efficient tracing of firearms is a very necessary 
component to trafficking investigations. While the information it provides is limited it does 
provide a starting point for investigations and intelligence gathering as the frequency in 
which firearms are traced to specific dealers or purchasers can be indicative of trafficking 
and thus provide for surveillance and undercover operations opportunities.  
One of the BATFE’s program geared toward low level trafficking is the Youth 
Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII). The initiative intended, through the use firearms 
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traces, to demonstrate that “there is a sizable illegal market in firearms involving felons, 
juveniles, and other illegal possessors and traffickers in of firearms…(which) includes 
corrupt federally licensed dealers who ignore the results of background checks, straw 
purchasers, unlicensed sellers, thieves and traffickers in stolen firearms, among others” 
(BATFE, 1999 webpage). Besides interdiction of youth access to firearms, the initiative 
sought to have participating jurisdiction voluntarily agree to submit information on all 
recovered crime guns to the Bureau’s tracing center in order to provide information on 
illegal firearms activity in the participating communities, allow collaboration with local and 
state law enforcement agencies, and allow them to focus their resources on area most likely 
to impact illegal trafficking to juveniles, gang member and adult criminals. The program 
was initiated in 1996 with 17 cities that expanded to 55 cities by 2000, with 44 of the 
jurisdictions having a population greater than 250,000. During the initial period in 1997, 
trace requests from the participating cities nearly doubled compared to the previous year. 
Their annual reports provided data on the types of crime guns recovered, thus providing 
indications of the type of firearms more likely to be trafficked. The reports also indicate 
time to crime (i.e. the elapsed time from original purchaser until it was recovered as a 
crime gun). The BATFE considers a three years or less time to crime as a short period of 
time and that a time to crime of 2 years or less may be indicative of trafficking (BATFE, 
2000). In the 2000 report summary, 24% of crime guns had a time to crime of two years or 
less. One of the objectives of the initiative was to have jurisdictions submit all crime guns 
recovered for traces. Of the 88,570 traces requested in 2000, 87.2% of traces were initiated. 
This is a result of incomplete or inaccurate serial numbers or guns sold before 1969 for 
which there are no records. The traces were able to determine the purchasers in 2/3 of 
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traces, with the unsuccessful traces related to incomplete dealer, or wholesaler and 
manufacturer information, and nonexistent sales records. In their 2000 report, the Bureau 
indicated a desire to expand the program nationally but yearly results of the program past 
2000 did not appear on their website. 
The “gun show loophole” has been claimed to contribute to all levels of trafficking, 
but it is more likely to contribute mainly to low level trafficking and somewhat to mid-level 
trafficking based on the number of firearms that may possibly be trafficked from such 
transactions, which thus defines the levels of trafficking. The BATFE is in a position to, 
with the proper self-restraint and low profile, utilize gun shows for investigative leads. 
BATFE frequently has an overt presence at gun shows, providing information on career 
opportunities, regulations, and laws. These venues also provide an opportunity for covert 
investigators to monitor vendors who, while presenting themselves as only non-licensees, 
may in fact have an illegal firearms selling operation. They are also able to conduct covert 
investigations into the sources of weapons of questionable origin (e.g. possible stolen 
military weapons or weapons with altered identifying marks). 
The BATFE has involved itself in low level trafficking, however from a historical 
view the level of controversy that the BATFE generates (Hardy, 1979, U.S. Senate, 1982, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 2006 ) in conducting these type of investigations may call 
into question the focus of the Bureau. Their resources may be more efficiently utilized at 
different levels of trafficking. As the Office of Inspector General reports in 2010, the 
BATFE should “focus it’s investigative efforts on more complex criminal conspiracies 
involving high level traffickers rather than low level straw purchasers” (Krouse, 2011 p. 
21).    
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Low Level Firearms Trafficking Recommendations 
Federal firearm legislation passage will always encounter difficulties. The political 
divide amongst Congress members on 2
nd
 Amendment issues is very evident and the ability 
of the NRA to muster political support, both at the grass roots and federal levels make 
federal restrictions a difficult thing to implement. While there are political roadblocks to 
enacting federal legislation to limit potential trafficking, it is recommended that states 
develop and implement their own laws regarding firearms dealer licensing and regulation. 
State officials with the backing of the law can inspect firearms dealer records and require 
other conditions to operate as a firearms dealer in their particular states. This can fill the 
gap left by federal legislation regarding monitoring the business operations of dealers and 
in prohibiting firearms that the jurisdiction deems problematic be it “Saturday night 
specials” or assault weapons. 
 This allows for more localized control over firearms dealers in their states and laws 
can be implemented that address that state’s particular trafficking concerns. Illinois, for 
example, requires a valid gun owner’s license to allow transfer of a firearm, even for 
private citizens, and other states have enacted laws limiting the types of firearms that can 
be sold and implemented reporting requirements for multiple sales. State laws regarding 
firearms dealers may allow law enforcement agencies and task forces to sharpen their focus 
on dealers who are selling off the books or engaging in illegal or questionable purchases by 
allowing them more access to records. State mandate reporting requirements also allows 
agencies to better assess trafficking patterns involving not only the dealers but the 
individual purchasers as well. Implementing long gun multiple sales reporting may be a 
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better means to monitor and limit the possible trafficking of assault weapons rather than 
resurrecting a federal assault weapon ban.  
While having restrictive municipal and state laws may limit the low level 
trafficking that occurs, because of supply and demand, an increase in mid-level trafficking 
could be the result as traffickers move to fill the void when local access to firearms is 
restricted. For example, while Webster, Vernick, and Bulzachelli (2006) noted that a 
marked reduction in Milwaukee’s sales of low priced handguns may have resulted in a 
reduction in their later use as a crime gun over a two year period. However it is possible 
that a study with a longer follow-up would have found that any reductions in firearm 
crimes related to this prohibition were short lived as traffickers either developed other 
sources for low priced firearms, either from elsewhere in the state or from out of state 
sources, or firearms users adapted to having to purchase higher priced firearms. Other 
unintended consequences may also be a rise in firearm theft as the profitability from 
trafficking more expensive weapons increases.  It is recommended that while state laws 
may limit some trafficking, there must be an awareness of and a plan designed for 
addressing the possibility of unintended consequences. 
As mentioned above, a number of the BATFE’s efforts apply across multiple levels 
of trafficking. This report recommends that the Bureau increase their focus on compliance 
inspections of dealers. The BATFE, as noted earlier, is well aware there are corrupt 
federally licensed dealers, and have stated they are undermanned in their investigator 
positions. Compliance investigation is an important first step in addressing trafficking and 
the Bureau made need to reconsider some budgetary priorities. The Bureau requested a FY 
2011 budget of $1.163 billion dollars, the bulk of which is salaries ($1.115 billion) plus $6 
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million for construction. Of that total amount, 72% ($837.4 million) is dedicated to just 
firearms. FY 2010 budget shows that on average it takes $113,400 to fund a “full time 
equivalent position” for a single year (Krouse, 2011). Based on the Bureau’s initial 
allocation of 624 investigators for FY 2010, a five percent increase in investigators would 
have probably cost the Bureau $3.5 million in budget relocation or allocation for 31 
investigators.  
However, besides accounting for more investigators, the Bureau should consider 
increasing the number of inspections conducted. Historical data shows that investigators 
are certainly capable of conducting at least 20 compliance inspections a year and data has 
also shown these are not wasted efforts in ensuring dealers are in full compliance. It is 
recommended that the Bureau undertake an examination of its investigator training 
programs and the way field inspections are being conducted in different offices. It is the 
expectation that efficiency and effectiveness could be improved upon and some established 
performance standards put in place. The Bureau should be striving for an increased number 
of compliance checks. For example in 2009 if the  number of inspections was increased to 
24 a year per investigator, and investigator ranks increased by 5%, it would have resulted in 
an additional 8,521 compliance inspections conducted, possibly discovering around 4,000 
violations. 
The Cook et al and Wright et al results suggest that the BATFE’s involvement in 
investigating possible straw purchases at local firearms dealers may need to be minimal 
considering the low percentages of firearms that are purchased from pawnshops, and 
dealers that later become crime guns. The Cook et al data also indicates that straw 
purchases may not be a large source of low level trafficked firearms. However, in light of 
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evidence that suggests straw purchases are used in illegal trafficking, there are features of 
handgun purchases that point to investigative leads. It is recommended that agencies use 
available data to focus investigative efforts on trafficking indicators like large volume 
retailers who reject a higher percentage of transfer applications, and multiple same day 
transactions made by young adults. These types of leads, derived from access to records, 
can lead to investigative and surveillance efforts that can reduce this level of trafficking. 
The BATFE already requires the reporting of multiple sales to an individual within five 
business days but by gathering and examining data, especially in markets, cities, or areas 
that are believed or shown to be prone to gun crimes and possibly trafficking, law 
enforcement may more effectively target their investigations. 
This report has found evidence that a portion of the firearms illegally trafficked 
enter into the black market through thefts. Street criminals note the ease with which a 
firearm can be obtained in their neighborhoods and part of what fuels that supply is the 
availability of unsecured firearms. Gun manufacturers, the BATFE, and state and local law 
enforcement can play a part in preventing theft of individually owned weapons by 
promoting the use of gun safes, lock boxes and other home security measures to limit 
access by theft to firearms. In some areas, for example North Dakota, the widespread 
possession of firearms and the rural nature of the states may make changing the way 
firearms owners secure their weapons difficult. It is common for gun owners in a state like 
North Dakota to display firearms on the walls of residences or leave them in easily 
accessible areas (Heley, personal knowledge). It is recommended that an intensified joint 
effort between the BATFE and gun manufacturers be undertaken to promote the safe 
storage of firearms, to provide more effective locks or disabling devices with each firearm, 
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and to continue to use and expand upon difficult to access locations of serial numbers to 
prevent them from being obliterated. This will help reduce incidents of thefts and assist in 
the tracing of firearms that have been stolen or used in the commission of a crime.  
Trafficking at this level is confined geographically. If a jurisdiction determines by 
assessment that a special focus on gun trafficking is warranted, it is recommended that they 
develop or utilize a suitable existing model program (e.g. Boston’s Operation Cease Fire) 
to address their particular problem. Law enforcement intelligence gathering is crucial in 
understanding the local gun market as was evidenced in the nature of the market in 
Chicago. Law enforcement can then take appropriate steps toward addressing the 
trafficking of firearms. Whether it is straw buys, burglaries, gun brokers, or gangs, the 
approach can be tailored to produce the most effective results through means like stings, 
crackdowns, and surveillance.  
If a law enforcement assessment of gun trafficking throughout a state warrants it, a 
recommendation is made that the state develop, through coordination and support with the 
BATFE, a state task force. The BATFE is able to provide training for task force members, 
drawn from state, county, and local departments. Task forces for municipalities or states 
provide for a concentrated local focus on trafficking problems that utilizes officers who 
will already be familiar with gun trafficking behavior in their area and have established 
street contacts. Mutual Operating Agreements through the Department of Justice can 
provide for overtime pay for task force officers (BJA, 2000). Utilizing task forces also frees 
up BATFE resources and manpower from low level trafficking so their attention can be 
focused on larger trafficking operations and a more thorough understanding of trafficking 
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through task force intelligence on a local level can assist the BATFE in higher level 
investigations.  
Mid-Level Firearms Trafficking Assessment 
As exemplified in BATFE trace data from the states, the surrounding states to an 
examined state provide more firearms to the examined state than do more distant states 
(BATFE, 2010), suggesting a regional nature to mid-level trafficking. Since trafficking in 
general involves the market components of supply and demand, trafficking to this degree 
involves transporting firearms to areas where availability of firearms may be restricted, or 
from areas where access to firearms is plentiful. This is determined both by the laws 
governing firearms possession and sale and the supply of firearms themselves. The 
trafficking of larger numbers of firearms across state lines, similar to any other trafficking 
operation of illicit goods, entails a coordinated effort between the parties. Criminal 
investigations across the United States have consistently shown that trafficking, whether it 
is firearms, drugs, or human beings, is often perpetrated by organized crime groups and 
their affiliates. These groups have the resources and personnel necessary to conduct 
efficient larger scale operations that could generate a profit. Consequently, a focus on these 
groups, specifically street and motorcycle gangs is important for this level of trafficking. 
The level of access these groups have to firearms also must be addressed. Of concern in 
mid-level trafficking is that the higher number of firearms being trafficked, could be 
indicative of supplying arms to other criminal organizations rather than individual street 
criminals, thus supporting other large scale criminal operations like drug trafficking or 
bolstering the arsenals of militias, extremist groups and other criminal organizations and 
gangs. 
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Federal and State Legislation 
It is important to note that state laws that allow increased inspection and regulation 
of firearms dealers above what it called for by federal law can assist in investigating and 
limiting trafficking. As noted in the low level trafficking assessment, state laws that restrict 
possession and types of weapons may disrupt the local trade in illegal weapons. Interstate 
trafficking typically involves moving firearms from states with more relatively relaxed gun 
laws (such as Mississippi) to states with more restrictive laws like Illinois. While more 
restrictive state laws may make low level trafficking more difficult, it does foster interstate 
trafficking to meet the demand for firearms.  
State laws that mandate inspection of gun sales records can also help generate 
investigative leads regarding possible trafficking. Accounting for these multiple sales is 
hampered by the limitations of dealer reporting requirement involving only handguns. 
Purchasing large quantity of long arms may be indicative of trafficking but reporting 
requirements on long guns is still dependent on state law, with the exception of the 
BATFE’s mandate on California, Texas, and Arizona on reporting multiple rifle sales, on 
two or more rifles to a single individual over a period of five days. The rifles must be semi 
auto, accept detachable magazines and be larger than a .22 caliber (BATFE, 2012).  
Establishing state laws that focus on dealer regulation will allow for investigative leads to 
be developed and further the ends of limiting trafficking and apprehending the groups 
responsible for trafficking more so than the laws that simply restrict possession or sale.  
Restrictive laws, while providing for a punitive action, will not be as effective in breaking 
the groups that are responsible for firearms trafficking, as leads can only be generated 
based on whether those charged with the offense would be willing to disclose information.  
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Gangs 
As mentioned previously in this report, a growing concern for the Department of 
Justice is the number of criminal gang members currently or formerly in the military. The 
NGIC 2007 report demonstrated that street and motorcycle gangs, while making up only a 
small proportion of military service personnel, do have access to military weapons and 
have engaged in theft and weapons smuggling from military bases and stationing 
assignments. The approach to combat this is two-fold.  Reduce the number of military 
service personnel with gang membership or ties and reduce the access of these individuals 
to military weapons. 
In regard to the groups engaging in the trafficking, in 2009, Eyler found that the 
U.S. military does not have policies that adequately prevent the inclusion of gang and 
extremist (white & black supremacists) group members from its ranks. Recruiters have 
overlooked or failed to recognize gang affiliations and there are deficiencies in obtaining or 
accessing civilian criminal records of potential recruits. (Eyler, 2009) The military has 
rarely used the RICO statues to prosecute gang members in the military that engaged in 
organized criminal efforts like the theft of weapons and Eyler (2009) notes that “cautious 
interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act has led to situations in which military police will 
not coordinate with civilian police in anti-gang efforts that may affect the military but do 
not directly involve a military actor. This failure to coordinate reduces the effectiveness of 
both military and civilian police at combating gangs” (Eyler, 2009, p. 719). 
The NGIC 2007 assessment noted that gang members have smuggled weapons back 
from combat zones to civilian associates and gang members. They have used their civilian 
associates and gang members to traffic military weapons to guns shows and dealers for 
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profit and to arm their individual members and other criminals. The NGIC report noted that 
a 1993 GAO report found that small arms theft was widespread but the NGIC report 
suggests that the true extent of military weapons theft is unknown. The NGIC also noted 
that lax base security allows civilian gang members access to bases and military personnel. 
This lax base security was also exemplified by the ease of access to unguarded or poorly 
guarded equipment storage facilities found on larger bases. Threatcon conditions at military 
bases determine the level of security taken and lower levels of threat, as determined by the 
base commander, call for relatively little security measures related to inspection of 
buildings and base traffic (Department of the Army, 1997). The NGIC report also noted 
that “gang members in the military are commonly assigned to military support units where 
they have access to weapons and explosives” and that “military personnel may steal items 
by improperly documenting supply orders or by falsifying paperwork” (NGIC, 2007, p. 
10).  
Task Forces 
Similar to their utility in low level trafficking, state run task forces can address 
interstate trafficking, particular to their state or region, and coordinate with other task force 
and agencies. West Virginia’s task force, funded by the BJA, frequently conducted guns for 
drugs investigations. West Virginia relaxed firearms laws made it a source state for 
trafficking to market states like New Jersey and New York where they were sold for a large 
profit. The traffickers then invest the money in drugs and return to West Virginia to turn a 
large profit from the drug sales. The task force debriefs federal narcotics charge plea 
bargainers for trafficking information, conducts interdiction at transportation terminals, 
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solicits help from citizens, dealers and other agencies, and trains state troopers on 
intelligence gathering in the field (BJA, 2000). 
BATFE Activities 
Applicable to mid-level trafficking investigations is the Bureau’s use of National 
Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN). One of the goals in the BATFE’s 
strategic plan is to increase the number of items entered into the National Integrated 
Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) and the number of NIBIN hits. NIBIN is intended 
to examine ballistic evidence from shootings and from their database link this evidence to 
perpetrated crime in other states. If ballistic evidence can connect a recovered firearm to 
crimes in other states, it can provide investigative leads into traffickers and trafficking 
trends. In 2009, out of the 187,283 bullets and casings imaged through NIBIN, only 2.8% 
resulted in matches (BATFE, 2010). However the Bureau does not give an indication of 
how much of an increase is needed to indicate effective performance and without a clear 
goal to strive toward, it will be difficult to determine the impact it has on trafficking. 
NIBIN items submitted are largely a function of other law enforcement agencies submitting 
evidence to NIBIN partners. The number of NIBIN hits will in part be a function of both 
how many items are submitted and how often a particular gun was used in a crime that left 
ballistic evidence, i.e. a spent casing or recovered bullet or the particular firearm itself. The 
author did not locate any information from the Bureau that addresses how this performance 
can be improved other than urging law enforcement agencies visiting the NIBIN website to 
utilize the network (Dept. Of Justice, 2011). Without a large and diverse database of 
ballistic information to draw from investigative leads and patterns of trafficking may be 
missed. While the NIBIN may have the potential to identify the possible movement of 
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crime guns by trafficking, with its effectiveness at generating hits at 2.8%, certainly some 
advances in participation will be necessary to make it a more effective law enforcement 
tool to address trafficking at this level. 
This report demonstrated that gangs have been implicated with some frequency in 
trafficking operations. The BATFE has a comprehensive focus on gangs and violent crime.  
As part of Project Safe Neighborhood, the Bureau is using Violent Crime Impact Teams 
(VCIT) which trace all recovered guns, investigate all firearm related leads, infiltrate 
criminal groups through undercover operations and confidential informants, manage the 
NIBIN system, and investigate corrupt FFL dealers. (Krouse, 2011). The number of gang 
related investigations from 2000 to 2007 increased tenfold and in 2008 the BATFE referred 
over 4100 gang members and their associates for prosecution. Congress approved a $10 
million increase in 2010 for expansion of VCITs. The BATFE is also partnering with the 
FBI’s National Gang Intelligence Center and the DOJ led National Gang Targeting 
Enforcement and Coordination Center (GangTECC). However wording in the 2010 
Appropriation Consolidation Act indicates the Bureau needed prompting in its coordination 
efforts with the FBI, DOJ, and other entities (Krouse, 2011). 
The BATFE’s coordination efforts with other agencies are an important component 
in gathering intelligence. Institutions like the NGIC and GangTECC can use their expertise 
to provide information about the structure and operations of criminal gangs to the BATFE. 
This will enhance the Bureau’s ability in using VICTs to investigate and infiltrate gangs 
that are involved in firearms trafficking. One of the focuses of the BATFE Strategic Plan 
for 2010-2016 was on gangs, however the focus seems to be on the role of gangs in other 
types of trafficking (cigarettes) with an additional focus on gangs and firearms as it related 
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to their use of firearms in committing violent crime and maintaining criminal enterprises. 
In 2009, the Bureau seemed to put a focus on gang related activity, reporting this gang 
related data but no data was reported for the previous years in the time frame. In 2009, the 
BATFE reported that 4,076 defendants were gang related gang related cases totaled 1,577. 
While a focus on gangs as traffickers is important at this level of trafficking, quality 
investigations need to be conducted in order to quash criminal enterprises. Examining 
historical data from fiscal years 2003-2009, the BATFE has recommended 88,748 cases for 
prosecution (it should be noted that the results include cases of all types but the vast 
majority of cases investigated by the BATFE involve firearms) resulting in 75.8% of cases 
moving forward to indictment. 77.7% of those cases (52,309) resulted in convictions. There 
was no case data available from the rest of the period to compare to 2009. However, for 
defendants, an average rate of “recommendation for prosecution” to “conviction” was 57.6 
% in the fiscal years 2003 to 2008. (BATFE, 2010). Compared to 2009, this same 
recommendation to conviction rate is down to 48%. While the percentages of those who 
were “indicted” to “convicted” rose slightly from the historical data to 2009, the largest 
difference is in the cases brought for prosecution that resulted in indictments having 
dropped from 76.8% to 60%. There was no previous year specific data available to indicate 
if this was part of a downward trend. The rate of recommendation to prosecution is an 
indicator of the legal sufficiency of the case presented. The reduction in the rate for the 
BATFE noted above may be indicative of an increase in cases that lack sufficient legal 
evidence to prosecute or that have other legal sticking points. This may be reflective of the 
quality of investigation done by the Bureau’s Special Agents.  
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In comparison to other federal agencies the BATFE recommendation to conviction 
rate of defendants is similar to the 2008 FBI rate of 44%, as is the recommendation to 
prosecution rate of 58.2%. However compared to the DEA who also face some of the same 
challenges in investigating trafficking that the BATFE does, their recommendation to 
prosecution rate of defendants is at 80.3% (which may speak to that agency’s adherence to 
the idea that it is not the number of cases presented but the quality of the cases (DEA, 
2011)). For 2008, the DEA’s recommendation to conviction rate was 70.1%. 
Mid-Level Firearms Trafficking Recommendations 
Similar to what was noted in the low level trafficking recommendation, state 
implemented laws regarding firearm possession, sales, dealer regulation, and records and 
reporting requirements will assist state agencies and task forces in combatting trafficking 
by allowing more access to records and control over sales than would be allowed by federal 
law. 
For the same benefits noted in the low level trafficking recommendation, if a law 
enforcement assessment of gun trafficking throughout a state warrants it, a 
recommendation is made that states develop, through coordination and support with the 
BATFE, a state task force. The BATFE is able to provide for training and overtime pay for 
task force members, along with access to BATFE resources and intelligence. Because of 
the interstate nature of mid-level trafficking, a task force is an appropriate entity to 
coordinate intelligence, enforcement, and investigative efforts with other neighboring state 
agencies so that concentrated, coordinated, and effective efforts can be made. 
Weapons theft from military installations is reportedly widespread (NGIC, 2007) 
and the thefts stem from two major security gaps: base security lapses and military 
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personnel who use their service as a means to access weapons. The obvious solution to 
address this problem is increased security on military bases. There is little to innovate in 
this regard, it is more a matter of willingness to engage in security practices that will hinder 
the theft of weapons and equipment. The U.S. Army’s Force Protection plan calls for the 
implementation of electronic surveillance for intrusion detection and video surveillance to 
enhance intrusion protection (Department of the Army, 1997), however it is unknown to 
what degree bases have implemented these systems. As base commanders more fully 
analyze the threat of weapons theft, the installation of electronic security systems may 
prove itself beneficial to combatting these thefts. An increased focus on weapons theft may 
also prompt base commanders to more fully utilize the security structure within the 
Threatcon system.  Threatcon levels are not solely implemented for direct terrorist threats 
upon military bases but can be utilized, at the base commander’s discretion, to address a 
criminal threat involving theft of military equipment (Department of the Army, 1997). The 
increased inspection of base buildings, identifying personnel on base, and the inspection 
and searches of vehicular traffic going on and off the base that higher Threatcon levels 
bring could enhance the military’s ability at detecting and preventing weapons theft from 
bases.  
It is this report’s recommendation that the BATFE play a more active role in this 
issue by forwarding its concerns to the Department of Defense (DOD), and prompting the 
DOD to examine security breaches and address the security weakness that allow these 
thefts to continue. It is recommended that the DOD explore utilizing enhanced electronic 
security measures and Threatcon level implementation to address established or developing 
concerns about weapons theft. The DOD already shares information on stolen weapons 
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with the BATFE through the NTCD, though the extent to which reporting to the NTCD is 
done and the timeliness of the reporting is unknown. The BATFE can assist the military in 
background investigations on suspected gang members while providing investigative leads 
concerning theft of military weapons and trafficking. 
This report also recommends an increased focus on intelligence gathering 
concerning trafficking operation that may be conducted by gangs and understanding the 
extent to which these criminal organizations engage in firearms trafficking. This report 
demonstrated that gang members have frequently been implicated in firearms trafficking 
operations and the BATFE should consider more than the use of guns by gangs but also 
gangs as traffickers. Any indication that gangs were responsible for firearms trafficking 
was missing from their current strategic plan. This focus will require coordination with 
local gang units, and Federal agencies with gang resources like the FBI, DEA, and INS. It 
is necessary to maintain the VCITs as this is an appropriate mechanism for assessing the 
level of illegal trafficking conducted by criminal groups and as a means to investigate it. It 
will need to insure it maintains communication and a solid partnership with other federal 
agencies to enhance their intelligence gathering capabilities and assist one another in 
investigations and operations. However, the value of VCITs can only be determined by 
engaging in quantitative analysis of the program to gauge its effectiveness in areas like 
gathering intelligence, producing viable investigative leads, and assisting in shutting down 
corrupt FFLs. It is recommended that BATFE conduct an evaluation of the VCIT program 
to insure its resources are being used effectively and that the programs are being 
implemented correctly. It will be useful in assessing the impact on trafficking by VICTs by 
determining the level of actionable intelligence produced through undercover operations, 
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the effectiveness that comprehensive tracing has on generating investigative leads, if 
increased participation in the NIBIN is witnessed through VICT management, and if 
increased focus on corrupt FFL dealers generates an impact on their operations and 
decreases trafficking. Proper oversight will also need to be addressed. Any time undercover 
operations and the use of confidential informants are utilized, case management is critical 
to insure that the cases generated have a strong legal basis. By insuring solid cases are 
brought for prosecution, the Bureau can improve on its performance on convicting 
defendants. 
  The Bureau should also insure that its agents and investigators adhere to best 
investigative practices. Two of the Bureau’s performance indicators are increasing the 
amount of defendants both recommended for prosecution and convicted. Historically, the 
Bureau has been viewed as an agency that has abused its authority (Hardy, 1979, U.S. 
Senate, 1983, U.S. House of Representatives, 2006) and in doing so is at risk for bringing 
legally weak cases for indictment. Having only 48% of cases recommended for prosecution 
result in conviction, as was evidenced in 2009, results in a recommendation to assess the 
tactics and tools used in Special Agent investigations. There should be adequate oversight 
of individual field offices and regional operations to insure that legally damaging practices 
like coercion, entrapment, and the use of unreliable confidential informants is minimized or 
eliminated. 
 The Bureau may need to adopt a more reserved approach to its investigations, 
working more diligently to develop solid leads, and conduct more intelligence operations, 
including surveillance. Investigation of individuals involved in illegal activities requires 
understanding the target and how they operate and conducting active, passive, and 
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proactive intelligence gathering (NJIC, 1988). Without effective intelligence gathering the 
likelihood of an effective investigation and successful prosecution are reduced (NJIC, 
1988).  
High Level Firearms Trafficking Assessment 
 Because the United States has a large stock of firearms, a potential criminal 
commodity, that is readily available, the ability of the United States to prevent high level 
trafficking makes the issue a domestic concern. Because of the ongoing concerns with 
narcotics trafficking from Mexico and its attendant violence, southern border firearms 
trafficking has become a focus of the BATFE. While there are numerous agencies who can 
play a role in preventing firearms trafficking (U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, CBP, DEA), this 
report examines the efforts and coordination by the BATFE with these other agencies.  
Legislation 
On the issue of export law, the very illegality of trafficking requires legislative 
measures to address violations. The GCA, NFA, and the Arms Export Control Act (AEC) 
expound on the regulations defining legal export by manufacturers and dealers and address 
more generally the export of firearms. The main legislative tool regarding cross national 
firearms trafficking is the Arms Export Control Act in that the legality of exportation is 
dependent on whether the item supports terrorism or increase the possibility of outbreak or 
escalation of conflict. (U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). Senators Feinstein, Schumer, and 
Whitehouse seek the ratification of CIFTA. While this is basically an agreement to engage 
in practices that would limit illegal trafficking, the measures and methods detailed do not 
differ significantly from what is already practiced in the U.S. One component of the Act is, 
if in accordance with domestic policy, that “State Parties shall take the necessary measures, 
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within their possibilities, to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery” (CIFTA 
Article XVIII) and to provide mutual aid, assistance, cooperation and intelligence sharing 
(U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). 
Firearms Trafficking Across the Northern Border 
Cook et al’s 2007 examination of trafficking in North America demonstrates that 
patterns for trafficking differ between the borders. While both Mexico and Canada have 
relatively restrictive gun laws, handguns are a more typical commodity in Canada 
trafficking as long guns (excluding assault weapons) are readily available legally while 
handgun acquisition and possession is more difficult. Contrary to the limited trafficking 
means (straw buys leading to small overland shipments) suggested by the U.S. for 
trafficking into Mexico, trafficking into Canada is shown to have taken a variety of 
approaches. 2008 data showed that 69% of traced crime guns in Canada were traced to the 
U.S. Traffickers have used concealment in vehicles, mail order, false documentation and 
declarations, and coordination with corrupt customs officials to accomplish their goals. 
However there appears to be relatively few cases that involve more than 10 firearms. Data 
from Toronto in 2008 revealed that while Washington State contributed to the source of a 
third of their smuggled crime gun, Florida was the next largest contributor (Cook et al, 
2009). 
Firearms Trafficking Across the Southwest Border  
Sources.     Cook et al (2009) states that Mexico’s prohibition on gun stores 
severely limits the sources of legal firearms to a division of the Mexican military.  
Possession is heavily regulated thus providing for a larger demand for all types of firearms. 
The BATFE states that a significant amount of weapons are being purchased through straw 
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buys at U.S. border state gun stores and are being smuggled across the Mexican border to 
drug cartels in small shipments called “ant runs” by the BATFE (Krouse, 2011). But Cook 
et al (2009) suggests that the contribution to illegal guns in Mexico from firearms 
smuggled overland into Mexico from the U.S. has not been determined and suggests other 
sources for criminals and DTOs. These would include freighters smuggling shipping 
containers with numerous weapons and ammunition, diverted Central and Southern 
American legitimate arms shipments, and pre-existing caches of weapons.  
The Cook et al (2009) examination of trafficking in Mexico cites three other 
sources of firearms for criminal elements and organizations: smuggling from international 
organized crime groups, illegal firearms trafficking through Central and South America and 
the Mexican military, which may be a main source of illicitly held weapons. The BATFE 
reports that trafficking sources are concentrated, with a small number of cases (97) cases 
between 1996 and 2003 accounting for a large volume of firearms (more than 30,000). In 
most cases the average number of firearms per case was 124 (a handful of cases involved 
much larger numbers of firearms), but the actual trafficking took  place in “ant runs” of 
small shipments each (Cook et al 2009). The concentration of sources, i.e. a relatively few 
traffickers trafficked a high number of firearms, suggests that high level firearms 
trafficking is done through an organized gang for the purpose of drug trafficking support, 
(Cook et al 2009) although this not synonymous with  arming drug cartels.  
In 2011, the GAO reports the number of firearms seized in Mexico between 2004 
and 2010, and traced to an original owner in the United States, varied between almost 
2,000 to over 14,000 per year (Feinstein et al). Feinstein et al also report that 70% of those 
guns came from California, Texas and Arizona (2011). But the 2009 Cook et al analysis 
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also demonstrates that the claims of high percentages of crime guns recovered that are 
traced to the U.S. must be understood in the context that recovered firearms are only a 
fraction of the guns used in crime in Mexico, that only a portion of those are traced, and 
that selectivity plays a part in submitting traces, so that there is no clear picture of how 
much of the illegal market the U.S. is supplying (Cook et al, 2009). 
BATFE and Interagency Cooperation     It was previously noted that a more 
pressing concern of the United States in regards to firearms trafficking lay at the southern 
border and this venue is appropriate for the assessment of the BATFE as the lead agency in 
this effort. The BATFE operates with intelligence stemming from the El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC) and works in conjunction with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). In 
2006 the BATFE initiated Project Gunrunner as an effort to disrupt the flow of illegal guns 
to Mexico and according to the BATFE, from 2006 through 2010, the Project has 
recommended over 1,100 cases with over 2,500 defendants for prosecution. Investigations 
have seized over 10,000 firearms and over a million rounds of ammunition that were to be 
smuggled into Mexico. The Bureau has dedicated over 100 special agents and 25 
investigators to the project (BATFE, 2011). The Bureau was allocated $37.5 million in 
2010 for the project and the project has received funding since 2008 in the amount of $73.5 
million for three years through the Meridia Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and 
Reduced Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008 (Krouse, 2011). 
The Bureau also maintains an attaché in Mexico City to manage the e-Trace 
program (in 2009, the Spanish language version of e-Trace had yet to be fully implemented 
(GAO, 2009)) but the Congressional Research Service report concluded that while traced 
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firearms frequently originate in the United States, unbiased comprehensive tracing has not 
been conducted that would allow any statistically significant conclusions to be drawn on 
the prevalence of U.S. weapons used in Mexican crime. The e-trace system for Mexico was 
fully implemented in 2010 but a DOJ Office of Inspector General report later that year 
found that the e-trace system produced little in the way of investigative leads. They 
suggested that the Bureau  work with DOJ to produce a workable long gun multiple sale 
reporting requirement and suggested that the Bureau “focus it’s investigative efforts on 
more complex criminal conspiracies involving high level traffickers rather than low level 
straw purchasers” (Krouse, 2011 p. 21). 
Operation Fast and Furious     As part of Project Gunrunner, Operation Fast and 
Furious, based out of the Phoenix field office, has generated some controversy. Bureau 
whistleblowers alleged that the field office was allowing straw purchasers to amass large 
amounts of weapons as part of long term trafficking investigations. Concerns were 
heightened when it was reported that as many as 2,000 guns made it into the hands of 
criminals and traffickers before they could be arrested and the firearms seized. Some of 
these weapons were found to be connected to Mexican crimes including the murder and 
wounding of two ICE special agents in February 2011. Congressional investigations 
continues into the operation and lapses in oversight of Fast and Furious. (Krouse, 2011). In 
a deposition to Congress in July 2011, head of the BATFE Kenneth Melson stated that his 
chief intelligence officer was upset with the operation but did little to shut it down.  
However the current acting director B. Todd Jones claims that Melson allowed overzealous 
field agents and supervisors to use unapproved tactics. (McClatchy Newspapers, 2011). 
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It is this zealousness that has characterized many of the negative incidents involving 
the BATFE.  If the culture within the BATFE is such that the overriding mandate over 
limiting access to firearms becomes so detrimental to the Bureau’s public image and allows 
violations of civil rights, then it is possible that the Bureau’s cultural view may be 
incompatible with the expectations that should be had for a federal law enforcement 
agency.  It is possible that a change in the Bureau’s mission involving reducing law 
enforcement operations activities and increasing industry compliance, education, training 
and coordination with other agencies may help scale back some of the heavy-handed 
approaches that have come to be associated with the BATFE and may help foster change in 
an overzealous Bureau culture. 
High Level Trafficking Recommendations 
The Southwest Border Initiative that the BATFE has employed involves significant 
financial and personnel resources and has generated controversy over its operations and 
focuses. To justify this level of expenditure it is recommended that a joint effort be 
undertaken by the BATFE and Mexican authorities to develop the appropriate statistical 
data in order to draw firm conclusions about the level that trafficking from the U.S. 
contributes to illegal Mexican guns, where and to who the guns go to, be they street 
criminals, criminal gangs, or Mexican DTOs, and examine how data, trace requests, and 
interagency intelligence may be shared and communicated more effectively.  
Without a more comprehensive picture of the nature and sources of illegal firearms 
trafficked to Mexico, resources cannot be allocated toward the most effective interventions. 
The ability to analyze intelligence and data is crucial in establishing effective interventions 
and without knowing if the focus of Project Gunrunner is appropriate (i.e. a significant 
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amount of firearms trafficking that warrants the expenditures of the Project), resources 
could be wasted. If data warrants a continued focus on trafficking from the U.S. then it is 
recommended that Project Gunner be re-evaluated as to its design and implementation. The 
GAO in their 2009 report also suggests increased interagency cooperation and coordination 
and evaluating the Project’s effectiveness, goals and strategies. 
Operations like Fast and Furious, while lambasted in the press, are instrumental in 
disrupting trafficking organizations. As noted in the CIFTA document, controlled 
deliveries are not only acceptable but expected in combatting firearms trafficking. 
Undercover trafficking investigations of any sort will invariably allow some criminal 
activity to occur, so steps should be taken to minimize the harm that ongoing criminal 
activity causes while conducting investigations. This risk of harm can be minimized 
through quality operational control and oversight. In Operation Fast and Furious, there 
appeared to be little coordination with Mexican authorities and BATFE personnel in 
Mexico, (Ellingwood, Serrano, and Wilkinson, 2011) little oversight from stateside 
supervisors, (Serrano, 2011) poor case management practices followed by field agents, 
(Serrano, 2011) and substandard electronic tracking technology employed in the firearms 
shipments (Pavlich, 2010). This southern border operation was not the only one lacking in 
oversight. In 2006 and 2007, Operation Wide Receiver utilized the same tactics and also 
lost weapons to Mexican criminals (Serrano, 2011). Thus it is recommended that an 
assessment of operational procedures of special agents be conducted to insure there is 
understanding and uniformity in acceptable operational practices and parameters. The 
Bureau has a long history of overzealous agents acting with impunity in their individual 
operations and it may be necessary to assess the culture within the Bureau itself to 
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determine if the Bureau needs to reassess its goals and missions as an agency, perhaps 
taking a smaller role in special operations and re-focusing on industry compliance, 
regulation, and the training of law enforcement personnel. 
Other recommendations that can be applied to both borders are the development of 
enhanced security measures. The GAO report (2009) notes that infrastructure on the 
southern border is not sufficient to handle the traffic flow necessary to conduct a significant 
amount of searches of vehicles bound for Mexico. Enhanced checkpoints utilizing vehicle 
x-ray equipment, as is being used in Canada, can increase the effectiveness and speed of 
vehicle searches. Electronic surveillance, including the use of unmanned aerial drones has 
been implemented on both borders for trafficking interdiction. It is recommended that these 
security enhancements be considered, especially as their cost effectiveness can be 
considered in the context of general border security and as interdiction in not just firearms, 
but drug and human trafficking as well. But it also must be considered that such measures 
will likely entail a large financial appropriation and to do so may require some empirical 
justification in reduced trafficking for the financial outlay required. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The ability to assess the means and methods, trends and patterns in trafficking will 
allow law enforcement agencies to more efficiently and effectively investigate and hinder 
illegal firearms trafficking. This report has shown that there are deficiencies in the data 
about what we know about trafficking and unless addressed, efforts to combat trafficking 
may lack focus. This report has also found that while there is a wide variety of efforts both 
legislative and operational designed to address trafficking, improvements can be made, and 
that some recommendations are applicable to more than one level of trafficking. This report 
recommends that for low level trafficking: 
 Rather than a focus on federal legislation, state legislatures should take the lead in 
addressing their local trafficking problems. 
 A federal ban on assault weapons would be ineffective considering the large 
number of assault weapons on the market and their limited use in street crime. 
 State laws regarding the limitations and regulations on possession, certain types of 
firearms, and dealers can fill the gap in federal regulations that hamper effective 
trafficking investigations. 
  Multiple sales reporting mandated by state law will allow states to better assess 
trafficking and assist in investigations. 
 The BATFE and firearms industry should promote, through a variety of means, the 
safe storage of firearms to reduce their theft. 
 Evaluate the Don’t Lie For The Other Guy campaign to determine if an effective 
message is being conveyed, and if there are any actual reductions or changes in 
attitudes about straw purchases. 
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 The firearms industry should continue and expand on efforts to make serial 
numbers on firearms difficult to remove in order to facilitate tracing. 
 The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative should be expanded and the data 
gathered used to provide comprehensive assessments of the degree and nature of 
trafficking problems in their jurisdictions so that effective strategies can be 
developed based on the assessments. 
 Though at a significant financial outlay, the hiring of more industry investigators 
should be undertaken to increase the number of inspections of FFL dealers. 
 Efforts should be undertaken to insure that industry investigators are properly 
trained and performance standards are established and met to increase the number 
of inspections conducted by individual investigators. 
 Local law enforcement should assess their potential trafficking problems and 
develop programs with a specific local focus to be effective at limiting trafficking. 
 Local or State task forces should be developed if assessment warrants their need. 
 The BATFE pulls back from low level trafficking investigations and allow state and 
local task forces take the lead. 
In regards to mid-level trafficking, the report recommends that 
 Similar to the recommendation for low level trafficking, state laws that enhance the 
inspection  of FFLs, especially in regards to multiple handgun and rifle sales, will 
enhance investigative capabilities. 
 Prompted by the BATFE, the DOD should assess potential and actual weapons loss 
and implement enhanced security measures on military bases, as warranted, to limit 
these losses. 
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 Renewed efforts should be made by the military branches to eliminate potential 
trafficking risks by improved recruiting methods and standards that more 
thoroughly vets potential recruits with possible gang connections. 
 DOD and BATFE coordinate on possible gang investigation leads. 
 BATFE should evaluate the extent that gangs are actively trafficking firearms.  
 BATFE should evaluate the effectiveness of its VICT program. 
 Local or state task forces should be developed if assessment warrants their need. 
 BATFE should assess special agent operational procedures for best practices and  
effective oversight. 
 The NIBIN should be assessed to determine the most effective means for increasing 
the participation of law enforcement agencies in the program.  
 Efforts should be made toward increasing voluntary compliance from law 
enforcement agencies on submitting crime guns for tracing. 
In regards to high level trafficking, this report recommends that 
 That an assessment be conducted of the contribution of U.S. firearms to crime guns 
in Mexico and Canada as a means of determining the appropriate level of focus and 
resources to assign to the issue. 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of e-Trace usage in Mexico so that improvements or 
changes to the program can be made to possibly increase its effectiveness. 
 That if conditions warrant the use of operations like Project Gunrunner, that 
operations be assessed to insure proper oversight and inter and intra-agency 
communication is well developed. 
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 Enhanced physical measures like fencing, improved design at major border 
crossings to facilitate the inspection of more vehicles, and the increased use of 
electronic surveillance and electronic cargo inspection should be implemented on 
the borders to help restrict firearms trafficking. 
 That the mission of the BATFE be re-assessed taking into account the possibility of 
a culture that exists amongst agents, investigators, and supervisors that is not 
conducive to effective operation of the agency and may require redefining of their 
mission toward less aggressive operational tactics and refocusing on other aspects 
of the Bureau’s mission. 
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